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POLICE USE OF DEADLY FORCE: 
STATE STATUTES 30 YEARS AFTER GARNER 
CHAD FLANDERS* AND JOSEPH WELLING 
INTRODUCTION 
The recent rash of police shootings has raised troubling questions about 
when, if ever, police are justified in using deadly force against a suspect. Some 
police shootings may simply represent wanton violence. Others may present 
close cases. How do we decide when a police officer can not only use force, 
but shoot at a suspect—even shoot to kill? When is a police killing a justifiable 
homicide, and when is it just a homicide? 
One place to start in drawing the line between justified and unjustified uses 
of deadly force is the Supreme Court’s 1985 opinion in Tennessee v. Garner.1 
Reading the majority opinion in Garner is a bracing experience. Justice 
White’s extended discussion of the common law standard of police use of 
force makes clear on many levels that he did not merely want to replace the 
common law rule: he wanted to bury it.2 That police could use any amount of 
force, including deadly force, to “seize”3 a fleeing felon—the common law rule 
which at issue in Garner4—was not only constitutionally infirm, it made little 
sense as a policy matter.5 Police departments had long ago abandoned the idea 
(at least in theory, but also in practice) that deadly force should be the default 
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 1. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
 2. Id. at 13–16, 18, 19. 
 3. Killing someone is way of seizing them. See e.g., id. at 25 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(finding that Garner was seized by being shot and killed). 
 4. See id. at 23 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (referring to the “venerable common law rule” 
that allowed deadly force to be used if necessary against a fleeing felon). 
 5. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
110 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXV:109 
option for stopping non-violent offenders.6 The common law rule, in fact, was 
a relic of an age where most crimes were punishable by death and most 
felonies were violent ones.7 However, we were now in an age of due process, 
where we had trials and did not “shoot first and ask questions later.” More 
deeply echoing throughout the opinion is the theme that the common law in 
our day and age is utterly lacking in humanity.8 The rule at common law 
seemed to suppose that it was always more important to catch a criminal even 
if that meant killing him. However, that is not always the case. Sometimes it is 
better to let the criminal go free than to use force that could kill.9 The opinion 
does not condone the offender in victim but it does, in a way, encourage us to 
sympathize with him: he may have deserved a trial and punishment, but he did 
not deserve to die. 
As powerful as the Garner decision was, it also was an importantly limited 
one. Garner was a case involving a suit under § 1983, the federal civil rights 
statute.10 In deciding such a suit, the Court has to announce what the 
constitutional rule is—and so in Garner’s lawsuit, the Court had to say what 
amount of force counted as “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment.11 
However, deciding the constitutional standard for Garner’s civil rights suit did 
not disturb what the standard had to be for state criminal law prosecutions.12 
States still have the authority to dictate under what circumstances police could 
justifiably use deadly force, and so avoid punishment under state law.13 
In other words, although Tennessee lost the lawsuit in Garner, the result in 
Garner did not require that it change its statute that permitted police to shoot at 
a fleeing felon, nor did it require any other state to abandon the common law 
rule14 States could still hang on to the common law rule—and even after 
 
 6. Matt Apuzzo, Police Rethink Long Tradition on Using Force, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/05/us/police-start-to-reconsider-longstanding-rules-on-
using-force.html?_r=0. 
 7. Garner, 471 U.S. at 13. 
 8. See id. at 15 (describing application of the common law rule today as having “harsher 
consequences” which are “disproportionately severe”). 
 9. See id. at 15, 17. 
 10. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
 11. Garner, 471 U.S. at 6. 
 12. Id. at 28. 
 13. As one state court has put it, “[i]n other words, Garner was a civil case which made no 
mention of the officer’s criminal responsibility for his ‘unreasonable’ actions. Thus, not only is 
the United States Supreme Court without authority to require this state to make shooting a non-
dangerous fleeing felon a crime, it has never even expressed an intent to do so.” People v. Couch, 
461 N.W.2d 683, 684 (Mich. 1990). 
 14. As if to punctuate this fact, the Court held the statute unconstitutional only “as applied.” 
Garner, 471 U.S. at 5, 12–13. 
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Garner, many did.15 States generally have free rein to decide what defenses 
they can have, and the scope of those defenses.16 A state can decide to have a 
“stand your ground” law, or it can decide not to have one, but neither is 
required—or for that matter, prohibited—by the Constitution.17 States can say 
officers are never authorized to use deadly force, or they can say they can use 
deadly force to shoot a fleeing felon.18 Again, neither result is dictated by the 
Constitution.19 
Many states did change their laws after Garner due to Garner’s 
compelling reasoning.20 Police could shoot at felons, these new laws 
articulated, but the felons had to be dangerous, or have committed a dangerous 
felony (states differed slightly in how they interpreted the holding in 
Garner).21 These states that changed their law to fit with Garner joined the 
ranks of those states that had already given up on the common law rule.22 
According to the Court’s tally in Garner, twenty-three states had the common 
law rule in 1985, approaching but not quite a majority.23 The number would 
diminish in the succeeding decades, as we report below.24 
The number has not yet reached zero. As the death of Michael Brown in 
Ferguson, Missouri brought to light,25 many states still had the common law 
rule, either as a matter of statutory law or as a matter of their common law.26 In 
some of these states, the actual status of the law regarding police officer use of 
 
 15. ROLANDO V. DEL CARMEN ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 
291 (Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2010). 
 16. See Part III, infra. 
 17. See Part III, infra. 
 18. Garner, 471 U.S. at 20. 
 19. We expand on this point in Part III infra. 
 20. It is also possible that some states did change because they believed (erroneously) that 
they had to change their laws. Many police departments changed their laws seemingly in response 
to Garner. See Samuel Walker & Lori Fridell, Forces of Change in Police Policy: The Impact of 
Tennessee v. Garner, 11 AM. J. POLICE 97 (1992). 
 21. Garner, 471 U.S. at 1. 
 22. See Part III, infra. 
 23. Garner, 471 U.S. at 17. “When in 1985 the Supreme Court in Tennessee v. Garner 
considered the constitutionality of deadly force in arrest, the Court, in summarizing the then 
current nationwide picture, indicated that about half of the states adhered to the common-law rule, 
while two others adopted the Model Penal Code verbatim and another 18 had similar provisions 
(the situation in the remaining states was unclear).” 2 Subst. Crim. L. § 10.7 (2d ed. 2015). 
 24. See Part III, infra. 
 25. E.g., William Freivogel, Grand Jury Wrangled with Confusing Instructions, ST. LOUIS 
PUB. RADIO (Nov. 26, 2014), http://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/grand-jury-wrangled-confusing-
instructions. 
 26. See AMNESTY INT’L, DEADLY FORCE: POLICE USE OF DEADLY FORCE IN THE UNITED 
STATES (2015), http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/AIUSA_DeadlyForceExecutiveSummaryJune 
2015.pdf. 
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force was a matter of considerable confusion.27 In Missouri, police 
departments by and large followed the Garner rule in their training,28 and the 
jury instructions for police officer use of force (approved by the Missouri 
Supreme Court) explicitly referenced the Garner decision and standard.29 The 
Missouri statute still followed the common law rule.30 A number of bills were 
proposed in the spring of 2015 to change the Missouri statute, but none of them 
made it to a full vote.31 All of them, to a greater or lesser extent, sought to 
make the law in Missouri closer to the Garner standard. Presumably, the issue 
will be up again for debate in the coming legislative session.32 
This essay updates the count of states who still hang on to the common law 
rule in their statutes, thirty years after Garner.33 The structure of our essay is as 
follows: after a recapitulation of Garner—including a discussion of the 
 
 27. Garner, 471 U.S. at 17. 
 28. See infra Part IV. 
 29. The Missouri pattern jury instructions can be found at MAI-CR 3d 306.14. 
 30. The relevant portion of the statute reads: 
3. A law enforcement officer in effecting an arrest or in preventing an escape from 
custody is justified in using deadly force only 
(1) When such is authorized under other sections of this chapter; or 
(2) When he reasonably believes that such use of deadly force is immediately 
necessary to effect the arrest and also reasonably believes that the person to be 
arrested 
(a) Has committed or attempted to commit a felony; or 
(b) Is attempting to escape by use of a deadly weapon; or 
(c) May otherwise endanger life or inflict serious physical injury unless arrested 
without delay. 
4. The defendant shall have the burden of injecting the issue of justification under this 
section. 
MO. REV. STAT. § 563.046 (2010). 
 31. David A. Lieb, Missouri Lawmakers Quit Early, Failing to Pass Ferguson-Inspired 
Changes to Deadly Force Law, U.S. NEWS (May 15, 2015, 8:58 PM), http://www.usnews.com/ 
news/us/articles/2015/05/15/missouri-legislature-enters-final-day-of-session-in-turmoil. For a 
review of those bills, see infra Part IV. 
 32. Rep. Brandon Ellington (D) of Kansas City said, “Well look anytime we end a 
legislative session we come back and we start looking at what we didn’t get over the finish line 
the year before, I’m sure we will be back discussing the use of deadly force statue next session.” 
Press Release, Missouri House of Representatives, Lawmakers Look Forward to 2016 (June 19, 
2015), http://www.house.mo.gov/pr/Video/6-19-15/Lawmakers Look Forward to 2016.docx; see 
also Push for Policing Reforms Expected In Upcoming Legislative Sessions, HUFFPOST POLITICS 
(Dec. 17, 2015, 10:44 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/police-reform_us_5672d668e4 
b0dfd4bcc0ca5c. 
 33. There is a useful count made by Amnesty International, but it is incomplete. In 
particular, it does not count those states that have their use of force provisions as a matter of 
common law rather than statutory law. AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 26, at 2; Oliver Laughland & 
Jamile Lartey, All 50 US States Fail to Meet Global Police Use of Force Standards, Report 
Finds. THE GUARDIAN (June 18, 2015) http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jun/18/us- 
states-police-use-of-force-standards-amnesty. 
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ambiguity of what is ultimately its holding (Part I)—we turn to our updated 
count of states that still retain the common law rule (Part II). Part III explains 
why, contrary to the belief of many, the decision in Garner did not require 
states to abandon the common law rule. Part IV looks at the most recent 
legislative efforts to reform the use of police force statute in Missouri. 
I.  TENNESSEE V. GARNER 
A. The Facts of Garner 
The facts as recounted in Garner present a police killing that seems not 
only unjustified, but almost wanton.34 The bare facts are that an officer shot at 
a person fleeing a burglary attempt.35 However, this does not do justice to the 
nature of the shooting, at least in the Court’s eyes. The officer who shot the 
fleeing felon seems to stumble at almost every step.36 The officer, Elton 
Hymon, thought the victim, Edward Garner was 17 or 18.37 In reality, Garner 
was 15, an eighth-grader.38 Hymon thought Garner could have been as tall as 
5’7”.39 He was 5’4”.40 In explaining why he shot Garner, Hymon says nothing 
about the threat Garner might have posed—in fact, Hymon was “reasonably 
sure” Garner had no weapon—only that he was eluding escape.41 
With Garner crouching near a fence, Hymon shouted “police, halt.”42 
Garner then hopped onto the fence.43 This seemed, to Hymon, to point to the 
necessity of shooting Garner, because at this point all hope of catching Garner 
was lost.44 Hymon could not jump the fence, because he was “carrying a lot of 
equipment and wearing heavy boots.”45 Compared to Hymon, Garner was 
“younger and more energetic.”46 Although Hymon was accompanied by 
another police officer, the other officer was “late in coming” to the scene and 
could not understand Hymon’s directions as to where Garner was fleeing.47 In 
the end, Hymon shot the fleeing Garner in the back of the head (Garner had not 
 
 34. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1985). 
 35. Id. 
 36. See id. at 21 (explaining that officer Hymon could not reasonably have believed deadly 
force was necessary). 
 37. Id. at 3. 
 38. Id. at 4 n.2. 
 39. Garner, 471 U.S. at 3–4. 
 40. Id. at 4 n.2. 
 41. Id. at 3–4. 
 42. Id. at 4. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Garner, 471 U.S. at 4 n.3. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
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yet made it over the fence).48 Garner died on the operating table after he was 
taken to the hospital. He had, it was later discovered, stolen ten dollars and a 
coin purse.49 For the Court, the shooting of Garner was a matter of mistake, 
misjudgment, and miscommunication.50 
The Tennessee statute governing police use of force at the time stated that 
“if, after notice of the intention to arrest the defendant, he either flee[s] or 
forcibly resist[s], the officer may use all the necessary means to effect the 
arrest.”51 Tennessee’s police department policy was apparently slightly more 
restrictive, but still allowed the use of deadly force in the case of a felon 
fleeing a burglary.52 A grand jury declined to indict Hymon.53 He was also 
cleared by the Memphis Police Firearm’s [sic] Review Board.54 Garner’s father 
sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.55 The district court ruled in favor of Hymon, 
finding he had acted reasonably.56 The appeals court also ruled in favor of 
Hymon—finding he acted in good faith reliance on the statute, and so he was 
entitled to qualified immunity.57 The appeals court sent the case back to the 
district court to determine whether and to what extent the City of Memphis 
might be liable.58 
After the district court found no liability on the City’s part because the 
Tennessee statute was constitutional, the court of appeals reversed: the 
standard supplied by the Tennessee statute, it said, was not reasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment.59 The appeals court presented its own standard for 
when deadly force was reasonable. Officers cannot use deadly force, it 
concluded, unless they had probable cause to believe the suspect had 
committed a felony and he “poses a threat to the safety of the officers or a 
danger to the community at large.”60 The State of Tennessee, which had by that 
time intervened in defense of the statute’s constitutionality, appealed.61 
 
 48. Id. at 4. The Court would later explicitly reference these facts when explaining its 
holding: “the fact that the police arrive a little late or are a little slower afoot,” the Court wrote, 
“does not always justify killing the suspect.” Id. at 11. 
 49. Garner, 471 U.S. at 4. 
 50. See id. at 4 & nn.2–3. 
 51. Id. at 4 (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-108 (1982)). 
 52. Id. at 5. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Garner, 471 U.S. at 5. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 5–6. 
 59. Garner, 471 U.S. at 6. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 7. 
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B. The Birth of the Garner Standard for Deadly Force 
The Supreme Court, in its opinion, took it upon itself to give a searching 
investigation of the common law rule of police force, and to reassess that rule 
in light of modern circumstances.62 It notes, early on, that the use of deadly 
force represents something of an anomaly in a system that is structured by 
trials and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.63 If you kill someone who is 
fleeing, you dispense with all that. You skip the trial, and go straight to the 
punishment—a punishment that cannot be reversed on appeal. As the majority 
opinion states, somewhat dryly but emphatically, “The use of deadly force is a 
self-defeating way of apprehending a suspect and so setting the criminal justice 
system in motion. If successful, it guarantees that the mechanism will not be 
set in motion.”64 There should be a bias against using deadly force, the Court 
surmises, if only for this reason: we prefer trials to summary executions.65 
The Court then answers the compelling counter-argument made by the 
state: the common law rule supports shooting fleeing felon; moreover, the 
common law rule was the rule at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.66 
However, to accept the common law rule in interpreting the Constitution, the 
Court replies, is to be in the grips of a “mistaken literalism” that ignores 
history.67 The common law rule may have made sense when all felonies were 
punished by death.68 Then, there may have been considerable pull to the idea 
that the police officer was simply accomplishing quickly what the court system 
would be doing eventually. Further, the common law rule may have been 
acceptable when nearly all felonies were dangerous felonies,69 as we could 
automatically presume dangerousness from the mere fact of a felony having 
been committed. 
Neither of these facts was still true at the time of Garner.70 The death 
penalty, slowly, but inexorably, was being limited to the most violent and 
heinous of crimes.71 It was not applied to all crimes, even all felonies, across 
the board. Now not all felonies were violent. In fact, many crimes that were 
misdemeanors in the world of Blackstone were now being treated as felonies.72 
Thus, two trends, working in opposite directions, made the common law rule 
 
 62. Id. at 14. 
 63. See id. at 13–14. 
 64. Garner, 471 U.S. at 10 (emphasis added). 
 65. See id. at 9–11 (“Petitioners and appellant have not persuaded us that shooting non-
dangerous fleeing suspects is so vital as to outweigh the suspect’s interest in his own life.”). 
 66. Id. at 13. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Garner, 471 U.S. at 14. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See id. 
 72. Id. 
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otiose: the death penalty was becoming more rare, but more crimes, 
particularly nonviolent crimes, were becoming felonies.73 To these two trends 
the Court added a third: it was getting easier to use deadly force.74 Before, 
deadly force was mainly inflicted by hand-to-hand combat, that is, after a 
fight.75 Nowadays, police can kill with one pull of a trigger. There may be, in 
such a world, a greater need for caution in using force—and for a rule that 
would discourage the use of force unless and until it was really necessary.76 
The Tennessee rule, the Court concluded, was “pure” common law, but 
that common law rule when literally applied made no sense in our changed 
“legal and technological context.”77 Proof that the rule was no longer good 
could be found in the evolving practices of states (discussed in greater detail in 
the next Part of this essay) but even more “impressive[ly]” in polices “adopted 
by police departments themselves.”78 “Overwhelmingly” police departments 
had chosen policies that were more restrictive than the common law rule.79 
They allowed force when there was a risk of serious harm, or death, and not 
merely when there was a fleeing felon.80 According to the Court, over 85% of 
departments had rejected the common law rule.81 The Court found the trend of 
departments to be especially persuasive, because it demonstrated that sound 
policing did not require the common law rule in order to protect citizens and 
prevent crime. 
The Court’s new standard, which was to replace the common law rule, was 
that deadly force could “not be used unless it is necessary to prevent the escape 
and the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a 
significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.”82 
This is how the Court announces the rule in the opening paragraph of its 
decision.83 Later, it clarifies, and puts the rule in both positive and negative 
terms. If the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officers or others, deadly 
force cannot be used.84 However, when “the officer has probable cause to 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. Garner, 471 U.S. at 14–15. 
 75. Id. 
 76. In a footnote, the Court also points to better communications technology, which may 
make it easier to catch felons, but it finds no persuasive evidence on this score. Id. at 15 n.13. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 18. 
 79. Garner, 471 U.S. at 18. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 19. A study published a few years after Garner showed this percentage growing 
even greater. See Walker & Fridell, supra note 20, at 101; see also Abraham N. Tennenbaum, The 
Influence of the Garner Decision on Police Use of Deadly Force, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
241 (1994). 
 82. Garner, 471 U.S. at 3. 
 83. See id. 
 84. Id. at 11. 
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believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm . . . it is not 
constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force.”85 The 
next line brings an even more specific statement of the Court’s new standard: 
“Thus, if the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable 
cause to believe that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or 
threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may be used if 
necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some warning has been 
given.”86 
The line just quoted is ambiguous, because it is not clear whether it is 
restating the rule or giving a specific application of the rule.87 The “thus” 
would could either be introducing an example of the rule being applied (as in: 
“for example”) or a further restatement of the rule (as in: “in conclusion”).88 
This ambiguity is important, because on it hinges the question of whether 
deadly force is only justified when the felon presents an immediate threat or 
whether it can be used also when the felony is a dangerous one.89 The later 
possibility suggests the rule that deadly force is justified even when the felon is 
not immediately dangerous, but has committed a dangerous felony.90 What 
seems likely, although it is not dictated by the text, is the following allowable 
inference: a police officer has probable cause to believe a felon poses an 
immediate threat either when he is immediately threatening or he has 
committed a dangerous felony which suggests that he is probably a continuing 
threat. Again, this is a conclusion not strictly dictated by the text—and 
explains why state statutes are split on the matter, even when they have been 
changed after Garner.91 
It is hard not to see the Court as being influenced by the Model Penal 
Code’s (MPC) standard for the use of force.92 They nearly reproduce it in 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 11–12. 
 87. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11–12. 
 88. See id. 
 89. See id. 
 90. Support for this can be found in Justice Scalia’s opinion in Scott v. Harris: “‘By way of 
example only, Garner hypothesized that deadly force may be used “if necessary to prevent 
escape’ when the suspect is known to have ‘committed a crime involving the infliction or 
threatened infliction of serious physical harm,’ ibid., so that his mere being at large poses an 
inherent danger to society.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 382 n.9 (2007) (emphasis added). 
 91. “Thus, at least some courts have read Garner to permit the use of deadly force by police 
officers to apprehend suspects fleeing from the commission of violent crimes, even if those 
persons do not appear to pose an immediate threat to police officers or to the public at large.” 
Michael R. Smith, Police Use of Deadly Force: How Courts and Policy-Makers Have Misapplied 
Tennessee v. Garner, 7 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y, 100, 100 (1998). See generally R. Paul 
McCauley & Lawrence N. Claus, Police Use of Force Statutes: States Inconsistent with 
Established Constitutional Law, 43 CRIM. L. BULL. 726 (2007). 
 92. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
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spirit, although the MPC is clearer about which way it reads the ambiguity 
noted in the previous paragraph.93 The MPC prohibits the use of deadly force 
except in situations where the person is either presently dangerous or has 
committed a crime using deadly force.94 It is possible to see the Court as 
endorsing this type of standard in Garner, although it remains unclear whether 
it believes that using deadly force on someone who has committed a dangerous 
felony is justified based on the fact that he is likely to be dangerous because of 
that (i.e., because he has shown himself to be dangerous in the felony he has 
committed) or whether this is a truly independent ground for the use of deadly 
force.95 The MPC treats them as two distinct grounds.96 However, there seems 
no question that with the MPC, the Court wanted to raise substantially the 
threshold at which deadly force could be used, far above the common law 
standard of “any felony.”97 It wanted to reserve the use of deadly force for only 
those situations where the felon was posing a risk of causing death or serious 
physical injury to others, or had at least committed a crime where deadly force 
had been used.98 
II.  STATE STATUTES BEFORE AND AFTER GARNER 
A. Garner’s 50 State Survey 
Section C of Part III of Garner contains a long and detailed discussion of 
state laws on the use of force.99 At the time, and by the Court’s own count, 
nineteen states had the common law rule as part of their criminal code, but—it 
notes—in two of those cases, the state courts had limited the reach of the 
common law rule.100 In California, the felony had to be a forcible and atrocious 
one, or the person escaping had to present a substantial risk of causing death.101 
In Indiana, the deadly force could not be used simply to prevent escape; you 
could use deadly force only to prevent injury or an imminent or threatened use 
of force.102 However, the Court still leaves this in their count of states that have 
the “common law” rule still on the books.103 Four other states, according to the 
Garner court, had the common law rule as a matter of their common law.104 So 
 
 93. See id. 
 94. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07(2)(b). 
 95. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 11–12. 
 96. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07(2)(b). 
 97. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 11, 14. 
 98. Id. at 11–12. 
 99. Id. at 15–19. 
 100. Id. at 16. 
 101. Id. at 16 n.15. 
 102. Garner, 471 U.S. at 16 n.15. 
 103. Id. at 16. 
 104. Id. 
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all told, twenty-three states held on to some form of the common law rule 
when Garner was handed down, although again, in two of those states 
(California and Indiana) the rule had already been watered down by judicial 
interpretation.105 
The rest of the states, according to the Court, either had more restrictive 
rules than the common law rule, or else—in the case of four states—the Court 
could not figure out what rule that state had.106 Two states adopted verbatim 
the Model Penal Code’s (MPC’s) rule on deadly force, which (as noted above) 
in some ways mirrors the Court’s rule in Garner, except it is clearer than the 
Court on the ambiguity between having committed a deadly felony and being 
presently dangerous.107 The MPC says that the fleeing felon either must have 
committed a felony involving deadly force or the threat of deadly force or 
present a substantial risk of death or bodily injury if not apprehended without 
delay.108 The Court puts Massachusetts in the MPC category as well—although 
it relies on some extrapolation to do so.109 
Eighteen states, the Court continues, have a statute similar to the MPC, 
though they use slightly different language: deadly force can be used in cases 
of felonies that use or threaten physical force, or the fleeing felon is escaping 
with a deadly weapon or there’s a chance the felon is going to “endanger life or 
inflict serious physical injury” if he is not arrested.110 The Court also groups 
Louisiana and Vermont with the eighteen, although they have no state statute 
precisely on point.111 The remaining four states (Maryland, Montana, South 
Carolina, and Wyoming), the Court says, do not have case law or statutes on 
point, or what they do have is unclear.112 
  
 
 105. The Court also suggests that Wisconsin’s rule may be a watered down version of the 
common law as well. Id. at 16 n.14. 
 106. Id. at 16–17. 
 107. Garner, 471 U.S. at 16–17. 
 108. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07(2)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). In other words, the 
MPC is clear, where the Court is not, that deadly force is permissible if the felon has committed a 
dangerous felony, even if he or she is not presently a threat. 
 109. Garner, 471 U.S. at 17 n.17. The Court notes that Massachusetts has accepted the MPC 
rule with regard to private citizens and “seems to have extended that decision to police officers.”. 
 110. Id. at 17. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
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Common Law Rule 
Definitely Still in Effect 
Common Law Rule 
Definitely 
Not Still in Effect 
Undetermined 
Codified by 
Statute 
By Case 
Law 
By Statute: 
MPC 
Verbatim 
By Other 
Statute 
By Case 
Law 
No statute 
and no case 
law or 
otherwise 
unclear 
19113 4 3114 18 2 4 
Total: 23 23 4 
The Court admits that the data it has does not indicate any clear trend away 
from the common law rule—which explains why, in part, they find it necessary 
to rely on police department policies, which it thinks do show a clear trend.115 
Indeed, the Court points to three states—Alabama, Idaho, and Missouri—
which considered changing their rule but rejected it (Alabama and Missouri), 
or briefly abandoned the common law rule, then returned to it (Idaho).116 What 
seems undeniable from Garner’s count is that there was still substantial 
support for the common law rule in 1985. Indeed, if we kick out the states 
where the Court says the rule was ambiguous, we have a twenty-three to 
twenty-three state split—half one way and half the other.117 If we remove 
California and Indiana, the count becomes skewed in favor of the non-common 
law states, but only slightly.118 
What about the thirty years after Garner? Have things changed or largely 
stayed the same? Can we find a more consistent and definite trend away from 
the old common law rule? 
B. Updating Garner’s Count 
The answer seems to be “yes.” Although we provide a survey of all state 
laws in the Appendix,119 here our focus is on those states that retain their 
common law rule (either in their common law or in statutes), and where the 
rule has not been substantially modified by state court decisions. Easiest to see 
 
 113. The Court counted California and Indiana in the first category, but its description of the 
“limitations” in the use of force statutes really places them with the other eighteen states that 
rejected the common law rule by statute. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 17 n.15. 
 114. We include in this category Massachusetts, even though it does not, strictly speaking, 
have the MPC rule “by statute.” See id. at 17 n.17. 
 115. Garner, 471 U.S. at 18. 
 116. Id. at 18 n.21. 
 117. See supra note 114, tbl. 1. 
 118. See supra note 113, tbl. 1. 
 119. For a detailed parsing of some state statutes see McCauley & Claus, supra note 91. 
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are the states which have retained the basic common law rule in their statutes. 
They make no distinction between types of felonies, and do not add any 
qualification about the present dangerousness of the felon. Most states now 
have one or the other or both qualifications to their statutes. Eight states still 
have neither, even thirty years after the Garner decision. Alabama says officers 
may use deadly physical force to “make an arrest for a felony;”120 
Mississippi’s statute allows that homicide is justifiable when committed to 
apprehend “any person for any felony committed;”121 Missouri also refers to “a 
felony;”122 the New Mexico statute governing homicide by police officers 
states that homicide is justifiable when “necessarily committed in arresting 
felons fleeing from justice” without qualifying which felons;123 Oregon still 
allows use of deadly force when the crime committed is a felony or attempted 
felony;124 Rhode Island also says officers can use deadly force when pursuing 
someone who merely has committed “a” felony;125 South Dakota has language 
virtually identical to New Mexico, although it phrases the rule in terms of 
when an officer is justified in committing “homicide;”126and Washington 
permits deadly force to arrest a person who has committed simply “a 
felony.”127 
By our count, that leaves eleven states post-Garner that have changed their 
statutory law to more closely resemble the Garner standard.128 Connecticut’s 
statute now states deadly force in making an arrest is justified only when the 
officer believes it is necessary to “defend himself or herself or a third person 
from what he or she reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of 
deadly physical force,” language which echoes Garner but arguably goes 
beyond it in the emphasis on the imminent use of deadly physical force, not 
just force that may result in a serious injury.129 The Kansas statute also mirrors 
Garner in requiring that the officer have “probable cause” to believe that the 
person has committed a felony “involving death or great bodily harm or is 
attempting to escape by use of a deadly weapon.”130 The other states that have 
 
 120. ALA. CODE § 113A-3-27(b)(1) (2014). 
 121. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-15(1)(g) (2010). 
 122. MO. REV. STAT. § 563.046.3(2)(a) (2010). 
 123. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-6A(3) (2006). 
 124. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 17 (1985). 
 125. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-7-9 (2014). 
 126. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-32 (2015). 
 127. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.16.040(1)(c)(i) (2015). 
 128. See e.g. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-610(b)(1) (2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-22(c) 
(2005); FLA. STAT. § 776.05(3) (2015); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4011 (2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 21-5227(a) (2014); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.140 (2010); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 732 (2006); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-108 (2010). 
 129. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-22(c) (2005). 
 130. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5227(a) (2014). 
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departed from the common law rule post-Garner follow in this model, 
adjusting the common law standard in either of these two ways: by requiring 
an imminent threat or by requiring a belief that the felony committed was 
“dangerous” in some measure.131 
However, we must also consider the states that had the common law 
standard, but not as a matter of statutory law. What have they done? Of the 
four states that the Court said had the common law rule embodied in their 
common law—Michigan, Ohio, Virginia, and West Virginia—only Michigan 
has most clearly not changed its common law. Indeed, a Michigan state case 
raised the issue, but for various reasons stuck with the common law rule.132 
The case People v. Couch dealt with a citizen—not an officer—using deadly 
force to apprehend a suspect.133 There, the Court went out of its way to say it 
was not going to change the common law rule after Garner and even doubted 
its power to do so.134 Ohio seems to have explicitly embraced Garner.135 
Virginia’s case law seems ambiguous,136 as does West Virginia’s, with some 
 
 131. See supra note 128. 
 132. People v. Couch, 461 N.W.2d 683 (1990). A post-Couch case (which, like Couch, 
involved a private citizen asserting the fleeing felon defense) recites the common law rule in 
Michigan: 
  To justify the use of deadly force to prevent the escape of a fleeing felon: “(1) the 
evidence must show that a felony actually occurred, (2) the fleeing suspect against whom 
force was used must be the person who committed the felony, and (3) the use of deadly 
force must have been ‘necessary’ to ensure the apprehension of the felon.” Id. at 596–597. 
Necessity is a question of fact for the jury to decide. Id. at 597. In addition, the private 
person must apply reasonable care to prevent the felon’s escape without violence. People 
v. Couch, 436 Mich. 414, 421; 461 N.W.2d 683 (1990), quoting People v. Gonsler, 251 
Mich. 443, 446–447; 232 N.W. 365 (1930). 
People v. Spears, 267572, 2007 WL 1203537, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2007). 
 133. Couch, N.W.2d at 684. 
 134. Id. at 684 n.1. 
 135. State v. White, 29 N.E.3d 939, 947 (Ohio 2015). Courts therefore apply Garner and 
Graham in reviewing criminal convictions arising from a police officer’s use of deadly force. See, 
e.g., United States v. Ramos, 537 F.3d 439, 457 (5th Cir. 2008) (“there is no question but that a 
police officer’s unjustifiable shooting of a victim qualifies as a crime of violence; there is no 
question but that a police officer’s shooting a victim who poses no physical threat to the safety of 
the officer or the public is unjustifiable”); State v. Pagotto, 555, 762 A.2d 97 (Md. 2000) 
(prosecution of police officer for involuntary manslaughter and reckless endangerment); State v. 
Smith, 807 A.2d 500 (Conn. 2002) (prosecution of police officer for first-degree manslaughter); 
State v. Mantelli, 42 P.3d 272, 279 (N.M. 2002) (prosecution of police officer for voluntary 
manslaughter, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and shooting at a motor vehicle resulting 
in injury); People v. Martin, People v. Martin, 214 Cal. Rptr. 873 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (noting 
that Garner “limits the scope of justification for homicide”). See also State v. White, 988 N.E.2d 
595, 612 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015) (stating that “it would seem logical” that Garner would apply in a 
criminal prosecution). 
 136. Virginia states the common law rule in its cases, but also seems to use a broad notion of 
“necessity” that encompasses aspects of the Garner rule (heinousness of the crime, 
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favorable citations to Garner in various places (in the case of West Virginia, 
only one)137 but stopping short of adopting Garner as the state rule. We are 
inclined to leave them in the “common law” camp, absent further 
developments or further clarification. 
The Court had also said that the law in some states was simply ambiguous, 
and we can update and perhaps correct their count. Some of those states, 
namely Maryland138 and Wyoming,139 we can now put in the Garner camp, 
which have cases roughly on point and which cite the Garner rule and other 
relevant parts of Garner favorably. South Carolina’s law—in the news 
recently140—still seems to remain a mystery. In an almost completely baffling 
case, Shepard v. State, the South Carolina Supreme Court stated the common 
law rule, viz., that “an officer may use whatever force is necessary to effect the 
arrest of a felon including deadly force to effect that arrest” but then adds a see 
citation to the Garner case!141 The standing rule still seems to be any amount 
of force can be used to apprehend a fleeing felon, which means that South 
Carolina should be moved from the “ambiguous” camp into the “common law” 
 
proportionality of the force to the circumstances), and generally just gives the question to the 
jury. See, e.g., Hendricks v. Com., 178 S.E. 8, 12 (Va. 1935); Couture v. Com., 656 S.E.2d 425, 
431 (Va. Ct. App. 2008). 
 137. One West Virginia court cited Garner in support of the broad proposition that “[c]ourts 
have recognized that the use of excessive force by a police officer constitutes an abuse of 
authority.” State ex rel. Billy Ray C. v. Skaff, 438 S.E.2d 847, 850 (1993). 
 138. See, e.g., Reid v. State, 51 A.3d 597, 611 (2012) (“Additionally, the Supreme Court 
defines the outer boundary of reasonable force based on the danger that the officer believed 
himself or herself to be facing at the time the force in question is used. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 
U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (holding that when a suspect is believed to be unarmed, the use of deadly force 
to prevent fleeing is unreasonable). 
 139. Roose v. State, 759 P.2d 478, 484 (Wyo. 1988) (“As stated in Tennessee v. Garner, id. at 
11–12, 105 S.Ct. at 1701: ‘Where the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses 
a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally 
unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force. Thus, if the suspect threatens the officer 
with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime involving the 
infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may be used if necessary 
to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some warning has been given’. . . Looking at the totality 
of the circumstances in this case and recognizing that a police officer must make split second 
decisions regarding such grave matters, we hold that the police officer was justified in using the 
force he used in this instance.”) 
 140. See Dana Ford, South Carolina Ex Police Officer Indicted in Walter Scott Killing, CNN 
(June 8, 2015, 5:30 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/08/us/south-carolina-slager-indictment-
walter-scott/. 
 141. Sheppard v. State, 594 S.E.2d 462, 473 (2004) (“The trial court correctly stated that an 
exercise of a legal right is never deemed a provocation sufficient to justify or to mitigate an act of 
violence. The trial court also properly charged that an officer may use whatever force is necessary 
to effect the arrest of a felon including deadly force to effect that arrest.”). See also Tennessee v. 
Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (during felony arrest, if arresting officer has probable cause to believe 
suspect poses threat of serious physical harm, officer may prevent escape by using deadly force). 
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camp.142 No cases in Montana post-Garner cite Garner, so Montana’s law 
remains ambiguous—it does not have a law specifically regarding police 
officer’s use of force.143 
In our updated chart, we dispense with the Garner Court’s division of the 
states that have rejected the common law rule. The Garner Court went out of 
its way to identify those states that seemed to adopt a version of the MPC 
rule.144 However, what is salient in our mind is not whether or not they adopt 
the MPC rule or some other formulation, but whether they have followed 
Garner in explicitly rejecting the common law rule. In other words, our chart 
recognizes Garner as the watershed decision that it was, supplanting the 
importance of the MPC as an influence on the law-making behavior of the 
states. There is now only the one question: Are you sticking with the common 
law, or are you following Garner? 
Common Law Rule 
Definitely Still in Effect 
Common Law Rule 
Definitely 
Not Still in Effect 
 
Undetermined 
Codified 
by Statute 
By Case Law   
8 4 36 2 
Total: 12 36 2 
III.  GARNER AND STATE LAWS 
To many, the persistence of states that have the common law rule is a 
source of puzzlement, if not outrage.145 In the aftermath of the Darren Wilson 
grand jury to not prosecute Wilson for shooting Michael Brown, it was 
revealed that the Wilson prosecutors themselves were unclear as to the correct 
standard to use.146 The Missouri law is the common law standard and it is the 
one that was initially given to the grand jurors to use as their basis for 
 
 142. We are grateful for a discussion on a criminal law professor’s listserv for helping us to 
confirm this conclusion. 
 143. The closest it comes is a statute regarding use of force to prevent escape from custody. 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-3-106 (2009). 
 144. Garner, 471 U.S., at 16–17. 
 145. See Arturo Garvia, Lawrence O’Donnell Rips St. Louis Prosecutor for Making It 
“Impossible for Darren Wilson to Fail,” RAW STORY (Nov. 27, 2014), http://www.rawstory.com/ 
2014/11/lawrence-odonnell-rips-st-louis-prosecutor-for-making-it-impossible-for-darren-wilson-
to-fail/. 
 146. See Chad Flanders, The Wilson Case Illustrates Why We Should Change Missouri’s Use 
of Force Law, ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO (Nov. 26, 2014), http://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/com 
mentary-wilson-case-illustrates-why-we-should-change-missouri-s-use-force-law. 
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assessing Wilson’s liability.147 However, later in the proceeding, in fact almost 
immediately before the jurors were to deliberate, the prosecutors said that the 
jurors needed to discard the handout they were given that had the Missouri 
statute on it.148 When one of the jurors pressed why they were being given a 
new law, the prosecutors largely shushed them, but appealed to Garner.149 It 
was because the Supreme Court had overruled the Missouri rule, they said.150 
This is incorrect.151 It is possible that the prosecutors, in an abundance of 
caution, chose to use the incorrect standard, because it was more stringent: it 
would be less of a help to Wilson, although it would not be the standard at 
Wilson’s trial, should there have been one. There is also a tension in the 
Missouri jury instructions, which do refer to Garner, and take Garner as the 
established standard.152 The statute would again trump the instructions.153 
Why didn’t Garner make Missouri’s statute unconstitutional, just like 
Brown made state laws regarding separate but equal schools unconstitutional? 
Garner involved the application of a standard within a federal civil rights 
statute, not a in a state criminal prosecution.154 State law treatises have 
recognized this point.155 As the Michigan treatise writes about the People v. 
Couch case discussed above: “Garner means that the use of deadly force by 
the police without regard to dangerousness violates the Fourth Amendment, 
but, of course, the U.S. Supreme Court cannot change the state substantive 
 
 147. Flanders, supra note 146. 
 148. Flanders, supra note 146. 
 149. Garvia, supra note 145. 
 150. Flanders, supra note 146. 
 151. See Bill Freivogel, Grand Jury Wrangled with Confusing Instructions, ST. LOUIS PUB. 
RADIO (Nov. 26, 2014), http://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/grand-jury-wrangled-confusing-
instructions. 
 152. Flanders, supra note 146. 
 153. In State v. Carson the Court stated:  
“[I]n fact, this Court has held that MAI–CR and its Notes on Use are “not binding” to the 
extent they conflict with the substantive law. State v. Anding, 752 S.W.2d 59, 61 (Mo. 
banc 1988). “Procedural rules adopted by MAI cannot change the substantive law and 
must therefore be interpreted in the light of existing statutory and case law.” Id., citing 
Mo. Const. art. V, § 5; State v. Dixon, 655 S.W.2d 547, 558 (Mo.App.1983), cert. denied 
464 U.S. 1072, 104 S.Ct. 982, 79 L.Ed.2d 219 (1984). As the introductory comments to 
MAI–CR3d specifically provide: The Court has adopted these proposals without 
judicially deciding or foreclosing any legal, constitutional, procedural, instructional, or 
other issues which may arise in cases even though the procedures, instructions, and Notes 
on Use adopted by the Court are followed and used. MAI–CR3d “How to Use This Book–
Reservations” pp. ii-iii (1987). If an instruction following MAI–CR3d conflicts with the 
substantive law, any court should decline to follow MAI–CR3d or its Notes on Use.” 
State v. Carson, 941 S.W.2d 518, 520 (Mo. 1997). 
 154. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
 155. Flanders, supra note 146. 
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criminal law, and this action would therefore not be a state law crime.”156 The 
Missouri treatise on criminal law says something similar.157 The standards for 
criminal liability in a state criminal prosecution do not have to mimic the 
standards for a constitutional tort.158 
It is true that the Constitution applies to the states.159 The First Amendment 
of the Constitution may mean that a state law is unconstitutional.160 A state 
may make it illegal to say bad things about the President, or to burn the flag, or 
to use coarse language.161 Such laws—and prosecutions under such laws—
would not stand under the First Amendment: they would involve obvious 
violations of free speech.162 Consider how different that is from whether or not 
a police officer should be able to appeal to a certain justification under state 
law when he or she uses force. There, the question is not whether someone 
should be punished for breaking the law, but whether his or her conduct should 
be considered a violation of the law at all.163 The difference here is between 
expanding liability in the face of a constitutional provision and being required 
to hold someone liable. States may be required to strike down laws, but they 
cannot be required to make them—or get rid of excuses or justifications they 
may have in the law. 
In general, states are free to be more expansive in defining the scope of 
their criminal law.164 States have to obey the Constitution, but they do not have 
to criminalize violations of the Constitution.165 They can make some things not 
a crime that the federal government criminalizes—consider the repeal of state 
marijuana laws in Alaska, Colorado, and Washington. In a similar way, a state 
could decide to legalize “being a police officer and using deadly force against a 
fleeing felon,” even if there is a federal law that comes out the other way. Not 
 
 156. Gillespie, MICH. CRIM. L. & PROC. SEARCH & SEIZURE § 5:60 (2d ed. 2015). 
 157. Although the statute may be unconstitutional for purposes of federal civil rights or state 
tort liability, it does not necessarily follow that the state is obliged to hold an officer criminally 
liable if his actions fall within the statutory privilege. In other words, it would seem that an 
officer charged with homicide could still assert the provisions of § 563.046.3 if applicable, to 
shield himself from criminal liability, since the statute has not been amended or repealed. MO. 
REV. STAT. § 563.046.3(2)(a) (2010). 
 158. Flanders, supra note 146. 
 159. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2. 
 160. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Strictly speaking, the argument would be that the person was justified in breaking the 
law, and so should not be convicted (not that they had not committed a crime at all). 
 164. Flanders, supra note 146. 
 165. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2. 
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all states have to have the same defenses.166 For the most part, federalism is the 
rule in the substantive criminal law in the states.167 
Furthermore, the Fourth Amendment, as a matter of criminal procedure, 
rather than criminal substance, does apply to the states.168 This is not relevant, 
either, in the context of a state criminal prosecution of a police officer.169 If 
Wilson had unreasonably seized Brown, and Brown did not die and was later 
put on trial, any evidence Wilson had gotten as a result of that seizure could 
potentially be excluded at trial.170 The consequence of a Fourth Amendment 
violation is the exclusion of evidence gathered as a result of that violation—a 
boon for the defendant. In other words, the Fourth Amendment does not 
require or mandate any criminal sanction for the officer who has violated the 
Fourth Amendment.171 It only gives the defendant an advantage at trial, and 
presumably, in negotiating a plea as well.172 It is true, however, that a statute 
plus a Fourth Amendment violation can lead to sanctions for an officer who 
violates the Fourth Amendment.173 A statute can say “if a police officer 
violates the Fourth Amendment, then he or she should be held liable in a court 
of law.”174 In fact, this is precisely what some federal civil rights statutes do; 
they give a cause of action for people to sue for recovery of damages sustained 
as the result of a Constitutional violation.175 However, the important thing is 
that the constitution does not do this by itself. It requires a statute to make 
something criminal.176 
 
 166. See generally Flanders, supra note 146. 
 167. There may be some point where a criminal law that did not have certain defenses—or 
made some defenses too expansive (“police may shoot at will”)—may violate due process. The 
Eighth Circuit briefly flirted with making such a claim about Missouri’s use of force statute, but 
for procedural reasons, the case is no longer binding. Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1007 (8th Cir. 
1976). 
 168. I credit this explanation to Loyola Law School Professor Eric Miller. See Eric Miller, 
The Ends of Policing, in OBSTACLES TO FAIRNESS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS: INDIVIDUAL 
RIGHTS AND INSTITUTIONAL FORMS (John Jackson & Sarah Summers eds., forthcoming 2016). 
 169. Flanders, supra note 146. 
 170. Exclusion of evidence obtained by violation of a suspect’s constitutional rights is the 
primary remedy for such violations. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654 (1961). 
 171. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 172. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655. 
 173. Ronald J. Rychlak, Replacing the Exclusionary Rule: Fourth Amendment Violations as 
Direct Criminal Contempt, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 241, 252 (2009). 
 174. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (displaying an example of deprivation of rights leading 
to liability in actions at law, including judicial officers in certain cases). 
 175. See id. 
 176. Although Congress may “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into Execution” the provisions of the Constitution, the Constitution does not, in its text, 
provide any remedies for constitutional violations, nor does it require the states to do so. U.S. 
CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 18. 
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The officer in Garner was sued under precisely such a statute, not under a 
state criminal statute.177 If a state’s criminal law has a more restrictive 
standard—the Garner standard rather than the common law standard—then of 
course the officer may be criminally liable under the state law. If the state does 
not have the Garner standard, then it is possible that a police officer could 
escape criminal liability but still face civil liability under § 1983.178 This is 
exactly what the result was in the Garner case.179 Officer Hymon escaped 
criminal liability (in fact, he was not even a party to the civil suit by the time 
Garner reached the Supreme Court), but it was still possible for the Garner 
family to recover damages from what the officer did.180 
Therefore, the prosecutors were right initially when they gave the grand 
jurors Missouri’s law as the one to apply to any prosecution of Wilson.181 That 
rule—basically the common law rule—is what applied, and not the Garner 
standard.182 Garner did not, as some commentators mistakenly asserted, 
“overturn” Missouri’s law, or Tennessee’s law, for that matter.183 Of course, 
one might favor the Garner standard for policy reasons, and many states did 
post Garner. However, it is a mistake to say that Garner meant that the states 
had to change their law, because Garner left those laws untouched. There is no 
requirement that state law fit with the standards for a federal civil rights suit 
against a police officer. If the attorneys supervising the grand jury thought that 
Garner somehow “overrides” the state statute, they were wrong.184 The 
substantive criminal law of the fifty states does not have to meet a 
constitutional standard of reasonableness.185 
IV.  PROPOSED CHANGES TO MISSOURI’S LAW186 
As we saw, Missouri was one of the states cited by the Court in 1985 as 
having the common law rule,187 and thirty years after Garner, Missouri still 
 
 177. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
 178. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
 179. See generally id. (1985). 
 180. Id. at 23. 
 181. Flanders, supra note 146. 
 182. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 15. 
 183. Id. at 22. 
 184. Flanders, supra note 146. 
 185. Flanders, supra note 146. 
 186. This Part is based on thoughts first presented in Chad Flanders & Marcia McCormick, 
Steps to a Sensible Use of Force Law ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.stl 
today.com/news/opinion/steps-to-a-sensible-use-of-force-law/article_7e237cd7-0d cf-50f8-bcde-
b4c07fca8c07.html. 
 187. 3. A law enforcement officer in effecting an arrest or in preventing an escape from 
custody is justified in using deadly force only 
(1) When such is authorized under other sections of this chapter; or 
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has the same rule. In the major reform to the criminal code passed by the 
Missouri legislature last year,188 they kept the rule—making only minor 
grammatical changes to the text of the statute. Moreover, in the comment to the 
statute, which was made effective in 1979, the legislature expressly disavowed 
limiting the use of deadly force to certain felonies (e.g., ones that involved a 
risk of death or serious physical injury), saying that such an approach was 
“cumbersome and impractical.”189 The comment did say that the officer should 
use his judgment as to whether the situation was dangerous enough to merit 
deadly force.190 However, such a dangerousness requirement is nowhere to be 
found in the text of the statute itself, which permits the use of force in cases 
where any felony is committed, even a non-violent one.191 In principle, an 
officer in Missouri would be protected by the Missouri law enforcement officer 
use of force statute if he used deadly force against a fleeing check forger (a 
class D felony).192 
The shooting of Michael Brown—and the subsequent decision not to 
prosecute Darren Wilson—brought renewed attention to Missouri’s use of 
force law. Add to this the confusion about the proper jury instructions given to 
the grand jury, and there was a sense that law needed to change, or at least be 
clarified. Missouri’s pattern jury instructions follow Garner by leaving out the 
justification of deadly force on a fleeing felon—departing from the clear text 
of the statute, which allows force to be used against any fleeing felon.193 Police 
 
(2) When he reasonably believes that such use of deadly force is immediately necessary to 
effect the arrest and also reasonably believes that the person to be arrested 
(a) Has committed or attempted to commit a felony; or 
(b) Is attempting to escape by use of a deadly weapon; or 
(c) May otherwise endanger life or inflict serious physical injury unless arrested 
without delay. 
4. The defendant shall have the burden of injecting the issue of justification under this 
section. 
MO. REV. STAT. § 563.046 (2010); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 20 n.21 (1985). 
 188. The changes will not take effect until 2017. Alan Burdziak, Prosecutors discuss changes 
to Missouri’s criminal code, COLUM. DAILY TRIB. (Feb. 12, 2015, 2:00 PM), http://www.colum 
biatribune.com/news/crime/prosecutors-discuss-changes-to-missouri-s-criminal-code/article_972 
acf33-08e4-5822-93b8-bae1b843070b.html. 
 189. MO. ANN. STAT. § 563.046 (West) (Comment to 1973 Proposed Code). 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. §563.046.3(2)(a). 
 192. Id. (noting the relevant language states “Has committed or attempted to commit a 
felony”). 
 193. MAI-CR 306.14, Notes on Use (“One of [the grounds for use of deadly force] is if the 
officer ‘reasonably believes that the person to be arrested has committed or attempted to commit a 
felony.’ This basis for the lawful use of deadly force by a law enforcement officer is not included 
in this instruction.”). 
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practice in Missouri also embodies the Garner standard.194 Again, Missouri 
state law is not required to follow Garner, as several media outlets 
misleadingly reported in the wake of the grand jury’s decision.195 However, 
changing the law might have at least some symbolic significance, even if it 
might not matter that much to practice. It could show that Missouri believes its 
police officers should use force only sparingly, that is, only when the suspected 
felon actually, and presently, presents a threat to others.196 
Several proposals were made to change the law in the spring 2015 
legislative session, introduced by Senators Dixon, Chappelle-Nadal, and 
Nasheed, and by Representatives Adams and Pierson.197 None of the bills 
passed the General Assembly, although it seems reasonable to predict that 
many of them will be introduced in the new legislative session.198 Our purpose 
in discussing them here is not to endorse one proposal over another, but rather 
to highlight the differences between the bills, and see how the compare to the 
standard articulated in the Garner decision. 
The bill that got the most media attention was the one proposed by Senator 
Nasheed.199 Her proposal required that police exhaust “all other reasonable 
 
 194. Some departments have policies far more restrictive than the rule announced in Garner. 
The St. Louis County Police Department policy, for example, authorizes deadly force only when 
the officer either reasonably believes it is needed to defend himself or others from imminent 
threat of death or serious physical injury, or when ALL of the following conditions exist: “1. The 
suspect committed or attempted to commit a felony; and 2. The crime involved the use or 
threatened use of deadly force; and 3. There is a substantial risk that the fleeing suspect will cause 
death or serious physical injury if apprehension is delayed.” The policy also requires first giving a 
verbal warning when feasible. St. Louis County, Mo., Police Department Procedures, Use of 
Force, Departmental General Order 10-29, http://www.stlouisco.com/LawandPublicSafety/Police 
Department/ResourcesforCitizens/DepartmentProcedures (click on “Use of Force” for PDF 
download). 
 195. See Part III, infra. 
 196. Our focus, for obvious reasons, is on Missouri, but we are aware of movements in other 
common law states to change their laws to something approximating the Garner standard. For the 
Missouri bills, see generally William Freivogel, ‘Flawed’ Bills Won’t Fix Confusion Over Deadly 
Force, ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO (Feb. 8, 2015), http://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/flawed-bills-won 
-t-fix-confusion-about-deadly-force#stream/0. 
 197. Some proposals were sweeping in their suggestions for reform, going to the regulation of 
police more generally. We focus here, for obvious reasons, only on the reform of the Missouri 
law enforcement use of force statute in each bill. See e.g. S. B. 42, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
(Mo. 2015), http://www.senate.mo.gov/15info/pdf-bill/intro/SB42.pdf. 
 198. Ray Howze, Senate Send Bill Changing Missouri’s Deadly Force Law to the House, ST. 
LOUIS PUB. RADIO (Apr. 29, 2015), http://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/senate-sends-bill-changing 
-missouris-deadly-force-law-house. 
 199. S. B. 42, supra note 197. Nasheed was an early proponent of revising Missouri’s use of 
force law. See Farrah Fazsal, Mo. State Senator Wants Revision to ‘Use of Force’ Law, USA 
TODAY (Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/12/01/missouri-use-of-
force-laws/19731233/. 
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means” before using deadly force and also that a warning be given.200 Such 
measures arguably move beyond the Garner standard (i.e., make the use of 
force more difficult to justify than Garner would), although Garner itself 
suggests the advisability that officers give a warning.201 
Nasheed’s proposal also gave police officers the permission to use deadly 
force against someone who is attempting to escape and “possesses a deadly 
weapon,” a change that potentially makes the statute less restrictive than 
Garner when it comes to the use of deadly force: on one interpretation of the 
language, an officer could shoot at a fleeing misdemeanant, whom the officer 
believed had a weapon on his person.202 There are other problems: requiring 
use of a deadly weapon—which is given a particular definition elsewhere in 
the Missouri Criminal Code—leaves out cases where a person threatens an 
officer or others with a non-switchblade knife or baseball bat or crowbar—all 
“dangerous instruments” but not “deadly weapons.”203 Nasheed’s proposal 
seemingly left open the recurring high speed car chase scenario, where a 
person may pose a serious risk to others, but without the use of “deadly 
weapon.”204 Finally, Nasheed’s suggested revisions would remove the most 
Garner-like part of the current Missouri statute: section (c) which allows the 
use of force against someone who may “endanger life or inflict serious 
physical injury.”205 
Senator Chappelle-Nadal’s bill, which got rid of the felony requirement 
altogether and says force is justified only if the person to be arrested “poses a 
clear danger to the officer or any other person” seems very close to the 
standard laid out in Garner.206 However, “danger” is an ambiguous term, and 
not one used in Garner, which specified that the danger be one of death or 
serious physical injury. Senator Dixon and Representative Adams’s bills come 
 
 200. Fazsal, supra note 199. 
 201. “Thus, if the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to 
believe that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious 
physical harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, 
some warning has been given.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1985). 
 202. S. B. 42, supra note 197. 
 203. As defined by Missouri statute, a deadly weapon is “any firearm, loaded or unloaded, or 
any weapon from which a shot, readily capable of producing death or serious physical injury, may 
be discharged, or a switchblade knife, dagger, billy, blackjack or metal knuckles.” MO. REV. 
STAT. § 556.061 (2010). Alternatively, a “deadly instrument” is “any instrument, article or 
substance, which, under the circumstances in which it used, is readily capable of causing death or 
other serious injury. Id. 
 204. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 374–376 (2007). 
 205. MO. REV. STAT. 563.046.3(2)(c) (2010). 
 206. S. B. 21, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2015); S. B. 417, 98th Gen Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. (Mo. 2015). 
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closest to Garner.207 Adams’s bill keeps the felony language of the Missouri 
statute, but adds that it must be a “violent” felony.208 Garner avoids the use of 
the term “violence,” which has the potential for ambiguity,209 and instead uses 
the language of physical injury and deadly force. Still, Adams’s proposal is 
roughly in the spirit of Garner. 
Senator Dixon’s proposed revision was probably the one that would bring 
Missouri law closest to Garner.210 Like Chapelle-Nadal’s and Adams’s bills, it 
gets rid of the felony language altogether, and leaves in the existing statutory 
language allowing the use of deadly forced if the felon may endanger life or 
inflict serious physical injury unless immediately stopped.211 That is the 
Garner idea and the Garner language, and it is already present in the Missouri 
statute. Dixon’s proposal was also the easiest fix to the existing Missouri 
statute, as it just cuts out the language that allows police officers to use force to 
stop a person who has committed “a felony.”  
What eventually made it to the House was a compromise bill that included 
changes from both Senator Dixon’s and Senator Chappelle-Nadal’s bills: it 
would qualify the any felony language to include only felonies that involved 
“the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical injury” and clarified 
that officers may also use force against a person who might endanger the life 
or inflict serious physical injury on “the officer or another person” unless 
arrested without delay.212 Both changes are broadly consonant with Garner and 
its emphasis on the seriousness of the risk to the life or the physical safety of 
the officer and those around him, based either on the fact that the person (a) 
has committed a dangerous felony or (b) immediately presents a risk of 
causing death or serious injury.213 Senator Nasheed voted against the bill, 
arguing against the bill as “watered down.” She would have preferred that the 
standard of belief for the officers be “probable cause” rather than “reasonable 
suspicion”—which would bring the Missouri law even closer in line with 
 
 207. H. B. 602, 98th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2015) (Representative Pierson’s bill 
represented almost no change to the law, as it still would allow deadly force to be used for any 
felony committed. Indeed, Pierson’s bill would remove the requirement that officer reasonably 
believe the use of force is “immediately necessary.” The reason for removing that phrase is not 
clear.). 
 208. H. B. 415, 98th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2015). 
 209. In interpreting a statute with the phrase “crime of violence,” courts have wrestled with its 
ambiguity – even when the statute purports to narrow the meaning of the phrase. See, e.g., United 
States v. Phillips, 732 F. Supp. 255, 260 (D. Mass. 1990). 
 210. H.B. 602, supra note 207. 
 211. S. B. 199, 98th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2015). 
 212. Id. 
 213. This again reflects the ambiguity in Garner: whether or not a person who has committed 
a felony involving the infliction of harm can be presumed to present an immediate threat. 
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Garner’s holding.214 Senator Rob Schaaf also voted against the bill, asserting 
that if the bill were passed the “perpetrator has no reason to stop when the 
police say stop because they know they can get away.”215 The bill was 
approved by the House, but eventually died in the Senate. According to reports 
at the time, Governor Jay Nixon “said he would encourage lawmakers to 
revisit the issue next year.”216 
CONCLUSION 
Garner was an important decision, but not important in the way many now 
think it was. It did not itself change state laws or require them to be changed—
and many of them still remain unchanged. However, it did state, clearly and 
powerfully, the problems with the common law approach to police use of 
deadly force. It set the constitutional standard and in so doing, it doubtlessly 
inspired many states to change their laws so that they no longer conflicted with 
Garner. Many police departments were also moved to change their standards 
to be in line with Garner, although as Garner made clear, police departments 
tended to be ahead of the curve in the standards they employed.217 
Whether the remaining common law states will stick to that standard, 
especially in light of recent events, we must wait and see. However, these 
states stand against the historical trend and the powerful message of Garner. 
  
 
 214. Howze, supra note 198. It is unclear whether in practice a requirement of probable cause 
would be that much more demanding than reasonable suspicion. Both are vague standards. 
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996) (“Articulating precisely what ‘reasonable 
suspicion’ and ‘probable cause’ mean is not possible.”). Nonetheless, in the criminal law, 
probable cause is a more demanding standard, and so a requirement of probable cause would send 
a stronger signal that police should use deadly force sparingly, if at all. Remember Garner 
required “probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious 
physical injury to the officer or others.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985). 
 215. Howze, supra note 198. 
 216. David A. Lieb, Missouri Lawmakers Quit Early; Deadly Force Bill Fails, MIAMI 
HERALD (May 16, 2015, 1:39 AM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/national/ar 
ticle21159438.html. 
 217. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 18 (discussing a brief review of law enforcement accreditation 
agencies). Although we hasten to add that merely because police departments adopt certain 
policies, it does not mean that these policies are always followed or that officers are adequately 
trained in them. That remains a separate question, which we have not considered here. 
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APPENDIX 
Survey of All Fifty States Use of Force Law 
All Statutes: Current Publication; all bolding added. 
Key: CL: common law rule in effect; G: common law rule not in effect 
(Garner-like rule); MPC: verbatim Model Penal Code; ?: undetermined; -s: by 
statute; -c: by case law.  
Model Penal Code 
(1) Use of Force Justifiable to Effect an Arrest. Subject to the provisions of 
this Section and of Section 3.09, the use of force upon or toward the person of 
another is justifiable when the actor is making or assisting in making an arrest 
and the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary to effect a 
lawful arrest. 
(2) Limitations on the Use of Force. 
(a) The use of force is not justifiable under this Section unless: 
(i) the actor makes known the purpose of the arrest or believes that it is 
otherwise known by or cannot reasonably be made known to the person to be 
arrested; and 
(ii) when the arrest is made under a warrant, the warrant is valid or believed by 
the actor to be valid. 
(b) The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this Section unless: 
(i) the arrest is for a felony; and 
(ii) the person effecting the arrest is authorized to act as a peace officer or is 
assisting a person whom he believes to be authorized to act as a peace officer; 
and 
(iii) the actor believes that the force employed creates no substantial risk of 
injury to innocent persons; and 
(iv) the actor believes that: 
(A) the crime for which the arrest is made involved conduct including the use 
or threatened use of deadly force; or 
(B) there is a substantial risk that the person to be arrested will cause death or 
serious bodily injury if his apprehension is delayed. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07.  
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Alabama Garner category: CL Current category: CL-s 
(b) A peace officer is justified in using deadly physical force upon another 
person when and to the extent that he reasonably believes it necessary in 
order: 
(1) To make an arrest for a felony or to prevent the escape from custody of a 
person arrested for a felony, unless the officer knows that the arrest is 
unauthorized; or 
(2) To defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be 
the use or imminent use of deadly physical force. 
ALA. CODE § 13A-3-27.  
Alaska Garner category: G Current category: G-s 
(a) The officer may use deadly force only when and to the extent the 
officer reasonably believes the use of deadly force is necessary to make the 
arrest or terminate the escape or attempted escape from custody of a person 
the officer reasonably believes 
(1) has committed or attempted to commit a felony which involved the use 
of force against a person; 
(2) has escaped or is attempting to escape from custody while in possession of 
a firearm on or about the person; or 
(3) may otherwise endanger life or inflict serious physical injury unless 
arrested without delay. 
ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.370.  
Arizona Garner category: G Current category: G-s 
C. The use of deadly force by a peace officer against another is justified 
pursuant to § 13-409 only when the peace officer reasonably believes that it 
is necessary: 
1. To defend himself or a third person from what the peace officer reasonably 
believes to be the use or imminent use of deadly physical force. 
2. To effect an arrest or prevent the escape from custody of a person whom 
the peace officer reasonably believes: 
(a) Has committed, attempted to commit, is committing or is attempting to 
commit a felony involving the use or a threatened use of a deadly weapon. 
(b) Is attempting to escape by use of a deadly weapon. 
(c) Through past or present conduct of the person which is known by the 
peace officer that the person is likely to endanger human life or inflict 
serious bodily injury to another unless apprehended without delay. 
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(d) Is necessary to lawfully suppress a riot if the person or another person 
participating in the riot is armed with a deadly weapon. 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-410.  
Arkansas Garner category: G Current category: G-s 
(b) A law enforcement officer is justified in using deadly physical force 
upon another person if the law enforcement officer reasonably believes 
that the use of deadly physical force is necessary to: 
(1) Effect an arrest or to prevent the escape from custody of an arrested 
person whom the law enforcement officer reasonably believes has 
committed or attempted to commit a felony and is presently armed or 
dangerous; or 
(2) Defend himself or herself or a third person from what the law enforcement 
officer reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of deadly physical 
force. 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-610.  
California Garner category: CL Current category: G-s 
Homicide is justifiable when committed by public officers and those acting 
by their command in their aid and assistance, either— 
1. In obedience to any judgment of a competent Court; or, 
2. When necessarily committed in overcoming actual resistance to the 
execution of some legal process, or in the discharge of any other legal duty; or, 
3. When necessarily committed in retaking felons who have been rescued 
or have escaped, or when necessarily committed in arresting persons 
charged with felony, and who are fleeing from justice or resisting such 
arrest. 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 196 (West).218  
Colorado Garner category: G Current category: G-s 
(2) A peace officer is justified in using deadly physical force upon another 
person for a purpose specified in subsection (1) of this section only when he 
reasonably believes that it is necessary: 
 
 218. But see the authority given in Garner that construes the word “felony” in subsection 3 of 
the statute to mean only the kinds of felonies that would justify lethal force as given in the Garner 
rule. “Consequently, the deadly force authorized by such statutes and regulations may be resorted 
to only if the felony is a ‘forcible and atrocious one’ which threatens death or serious bodily harm 
or there are other circumstances which reasonably create a fear of death or serious bodily harm to 
the officer or other person.” Kortum v. Alkire, 138 Cal. Rptr. 26, 31 (Ct. App. 1977). 
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(a) To defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be 
the use or imminent use of deadly physical force; or 
(b) To effect an arrest, or to prevent the escape from custody, of a person 
whom he reasonably believes: 
(I) Has committed or attempted to commit a felony involving the use or 
threatened use of a deadly weapon; or 
(II) Is attempting to escape by the use of a deadly weapon; or 
(III) Otherwise indicates, except through a motor vehicle violation, that he 
is likely to endanger human life or to inflict serious bodily injury to 
another unless apprehended without delay. 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-707.  
Connecticut Garner category: CL Current category: G-s 
(c) A peace officer, special policeman appointed under section 29-18b, motor 
vehicle inspector designated under section 14-8 and certified pursuant to 
section 7-294d or authorized official of the Department of Correction or the 
Board of Pardons and Paroles is justified in using deadly physical force upon 
another person for the purposes specified in subsection (b) of this section only 
when he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to: 
(1) Defend himself or herself or a third person from the use or imminent use of 
deadly physical force; or 
(2) effect an arrest or prevent the escape from custody of a person whom 
he or she reasonably believes has committed or attempted to commit a 
felony which involved the infliction or threatened infliction of serious 
physical injury and if, where feasible, he or she has given warning of his 
or her intent to use deadly physical force. 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-22.  
Delaware Garner category: G Current category: G-s 
(c) The use of deadly force is justifiable under this section if all other 
reasonable means of apprehension have been exhausted, and: 
(1) The defendant believes the arrest is for any crime involving physical 
injury or threat thereof, and the deadly force is directed at a vehicle to 
disable it for the purpose of effecting the arrest, or the defendant believes 
the arrest is for a felony involving physical injury or threat thereof; 
(2) The defendant believes that the force employed creates no substantial 
risk of injury to innocent persons; and 
(3) The defendant believes that there is a substantial risk that the person 
to be arrested will cause death or serious physical injury, or will never be 
captured if apprehension is delayed. 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 467 (West).  
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Florida Garner category: CL Current category: CL-s 
A law enforcement officer, or any person whom the officer has summoned or 
directed to assist him or her, need not retreat or desist from efforts to make a 
lawful arrest because of resistance or threatened resistance to the arrest. The 
officer is justified in the use of any force: 
(1) Which he or she reasonably believes to be necessary to defend himself or 
herself or another from bodily harm while making the arrest; 
(2) When necessarily committed in retaking felons who have escaped; or 
(3) When necessarily committed in arresting felons fleeing from justice. 
However, this subsection shall not constitute a defense in any civil action for 
damages brought for the wrongful use of deadly force unless the use of deadly 
force was necessary to prevent the arrest from being defeated by such flight 
and, when feasible, some warning had been given, and: 
(a) The officer reasonably believes that the fleeing felon poses a threat of death 
or serious physical harm to the officer or others; or 
(b) The officer reasonably believes that the fleeing felon has committed a 
crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm 
to another person. 
FLA. STAT. § 776.05.219  
Georgia Garner category: G Current category: G-s 
(b) Sheriffs and peace officers who are appointed or employed in conformity 
with Chapter 8 of Title 35 may use deadly force to apprehend a suspected 
felon only when the officer reasonably believes that the suspect possesses a 
deadly weapon or any object, device, or instrument which, when used 
offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious 
bodily injury; when the officer reasonably believes that the suspect poses 
an immediate threat of physical violence to the officer or others; or when 
there is probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed a crime 
involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm. 
Nothing in this Code section shall be construed so as to restrict such sheriffs or 
peace officers from the use of such reasonable nondeadly force as may be 
necessary to apprehend and arrest a suspected felon or misdemeanant. 
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-4-20.  
 
 219. Note: everything from “However” on in subsection 3 pertains only to defenses in a civil 
action. For purposes of criminal justification defense, the only operative language is the bolded 
text. 
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Hawaii Garner category: MPC Current category: G-s 
(3) The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this section unless: 
(a) The arrest is for a felony; 
(b) The person effecting the arrest is authorized to act as a law enforcement 
officer or is assisting a person whom he believes to be authorized to act as a 
law enforcement officer; 
(c) The actor believes that the force employed creates no substantial risk of 
injury to innocent persons; and 
(d) The actor believes that: 
(i) The crimes for which the arrest is made involved conduct including the 
use or threatened use of deadly force; or 
(ii) There is a substantial risk that the person to be arrested will cause 
death or serious bodily injury if his apprehension is delayed. 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 703-307.220  
Idaho Garner category: CL Current category: G-s 
Homicide is justifiable when committed by public officers and those acting 
by their command in their aid and assistance, either: 
1. In obedience to any judgment of a competent court; or 
2. When reasonably necessary in overcoming actual resistance to the 
execution of some legal process, or in the discharge of any other legal duty 
including suppression of riot or keeping and preserving the peace. Use of 
deadly force shall not be justified in overcoming actual resistance unless 
the officer has probable cause to believe that the resistance poses a threat 
of death or serious physical injury to the officer or to other persons; or 
3. When reasonably necessary in preventing rescue or escape or in retaking 
inmates who have been rescued or have escaped from any jail, or when 
reasonably necessary in order to prevent the escape of any person charged 
with or suspected of having committed a felony, provided the officer has 
probable cause to believe that the inmate, or persons assisting his escape, 
or the person suspected of or charged with the commission of a felony 
poses a threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or other 
persons. 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4011.  
 
 220. Note the additional limitation in subsection (3)(c) that force may not be used when it 
poses a risk to innocent bystanders. This provision goes beyond the rule in Garner. 
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Illinois Garner category: G Current category: G-s 
(a) A peace officer, or any person whom he has summoned or directed to 
assist him, need not retreat or desist from efforts to make a lawful arrest 
because of resistance or threatened resistance to the arrest. He is justified in 
the use of any force which he reasonably believes to be necessary to effect 
the arrest and of any force which he reasonably believes to be necessary to 
defend himself or another from bodily harm while making the arrest. 
However, he is justified in using force likely to cause death or great bodily 
harm only when he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to 
prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or such other person, or 
when he reasonably believes both that: 
(1) Such force is necessary to prevent the arrest from being defeated by 
resistance or escape; and 
(2) The person to be arrested has committed or attempted a forcible felony 
which involves the infliction or threatened infliction of great bodily harm 
or is attempting to escape by use of a deadly weapon, or otherwise 
indicates that he will endanger human life or inflict great bodily harm 
unless arrested without delay. 
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7-5.  
Indiana Garner category: CL Current category: G-s 
(b) A law enforcement officer is justified in using reasonable force if the 
officer reasonably believes that the force is necessary to effect a lawful arrest. 
However, an officer is justified in using deadly force only if the officer: 
(1) has probable cause to believe that that deadly force is necessary: 
(A) to prevent the commission of a forcible felony; or 
(B) to effect an arrest of a person who the officer has probable cause to believe 
poses a threat of serious bodily injury to the officer or a third person; and 
(2) has given a warning, if feasible, to the person against whom the deadly 
force is to be used. 
IND. CODE § 35-41-3-3.221  
Iowa Garner category: G Current category: G-s 
1. A peace officer, while making a lawful arrest, is justified in the use of any 
force which the peace officer reasonably believes to be necessary to effect the 
 
 221. While Garner place Indiana in the common law category, it noted some limitation: “In 
Indiana, deadly force may be used only to prevent injury, the imminent danger of injury or force, 
or the threat of force. It is not permitted simply to prevent escape.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 
1, 17 (1985) (citing Rose v. State, 431 N.E.2d 521 (Ind.App.1982)). 
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arrest or to defend any person from bodily harm while making the arrest. 
However, the use of deadly force is only justified when a person cannot be 
captured any other way and either of the following apply: 
a. The person has used or threatened to use deadly force in committing a 
felony. 
b. The peace officer reasonably believes the person would use deadly force 
against any person unless immediately apprehended. 
IOWA CODE § 804.8.  
Kansas Garner category: CL Current category: G-s 
(a) A law enforcement officer, or any person whom such officer has 
summoned or directed to assist in making a lawful arrest, need not retreat or 
desist from efforts to make a lawful arrest because of resistance or threatened 
resistance to the arrest. Such officer is justified in the use of any force which 
such officer reasonably believes to be necessary to effect the arrest and the use 
of any force which such officer reasonably believes to be necessary to defend 
the officer’s self or another from bodily harm while making the arrest. 
However, such officer is justified in using deadly force only when such 
officer reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent death or 
great bodily harm to such officer or another person, or when such officer 
reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent the arrest from 
being defeated by resistance or escape and such officer has probable cause 
to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or attempted to 
commit a felony involving death or great bodily harm or is attempting to 
escape by use of a deadly weapon, or otherwise indicates that such person 
will endanger human life or inflict great bodily harm unless arrested 
without delay. 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5227.  
Kentucky Garner category: G Current category: G-s 
(2) The use of deadly physical force by a defendant upon another person is 
justifiable under subsection (1) only when: 
(a) The defendant, in effecting the arrest, is authorized to act as a peace 
officer; and 
(b) The arrest is for a felony involving the use or threatened use of 
physical force likely to cause death or serious physical injury; and 
(c) The defendant believes that the person to be arrested is likely to 
endanger human life unless apprehended without delay. 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.090 (West).  
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Louisiana Garner category: MPC Current category: G-s 
A person shall submit peaceably to a lawful arrest. The person making a 
lawful arrest may use reasonable force to effect the arrest and detention, 
and also to overcome any resistance or threatened resistance of the person 
being arrested or detained. 
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 220. 
Section 14:20. Justifiable homicide 
A. A homicide is justifiable: 
(1) When committed in self-defense by one who reasonably believes that he is 
in imminent danger of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm and that 
the killing is necessary to save himself from that danger. 
(2) When committed for the purpose of preventing a violent or forcible 
felony involving danger to life or of great bodily harm by one who 
reasonably believes that such an offense is about to be committed and that 
such action is necessary for its prevention. The circumstances must be 
sufficient to excite the fear of a reasonable person that there would be 
serious danger to his own life or person if he attempted to prevent the 
felony without the killing. 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:20.  
Maine Garner category: G Current category: G-s 
2. A law enforcement officer is justified in using deadly force only when 
the officer reasonably believes such force is necessary: 
A. For self-defense or to defend a 3rd person from what the officer reasonably 
believes is the imminent use of unlawful deadly force; or 
B. To effect an arrest or prevent the escape from arrest of a person when the 
law enforcement officer reasonably believes that the person has committed 
a crime involving the use or threatened use of deadly force, is using a 
dangerous weapon in attempting to escape or otherwise indicates that the 
person is likely to endanger seriously human life or to inflict serious bodily 
injury unless apprehended without delay; and 
(1) The law enforcement officer has made reasonable efforts to advise the 
person that the officer is a law enforcement officer attempting to effect an 
arrest or prevent the escape from arrest and the officer has reasonable grounds 
to believe that the person is aware of this advice; or 
(2) The law enforcement officer reasonably believes that the person to be 
arrested otherwise knows that the officer is a law enforcement officer 
attempting to effect an arrest or prevent the escape from arrest. 
For purposes of this paragraph, “a reasonable belief that another has committed 
a crime involving use or threatened use of deadly force” means such 
reasonable belief in facts, circumstances and the law that, if true, would 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2015] POLICE USE OF DEADLY FORCE: STATE STATUTES 30 YEARS AFTER GARNER 143 
constitute such an offense by that person. If the facts and circumstances 
reasonably believed would not constitute such an offense, an erroneous but 
reasonable belief that the law is otherwise justifies the use of deadly force to 
make an arrest or prevent an escape.  
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 107.  
Maryland Garner category: ? Current category: G-c 
Maryland has moved to a Garner-like rule from undetermined (probably closer 
to the common law rule) by tying its common law “reasonable” analysis to 
compliance with established law enforcement policies.222  
Massachusetts Garner category: MPC-c Current category: G-c 
Garner cited two cases, Klein and Randazzo in saying Massachusetts should 
probably be considered to have adopted the MPC via its case law. Both cases 
explicitly adopt the MPC as their rule. Com. v. Klein, 363 N.E.2d 1313, 1318 
(Mass. 1977); Julian v. Randazzo, 403 N.E.2d 931, 934 (Mass. 1980).223  
Michigan Garner category: CL Current category: CL-c 
Michigan has not moved on. It still has no statute and the case law (especially 
Couch) explicitly rejects adopting a Garner-like rule. People v. Couch, 461 
N.W.2d 683, 684 (1990). While Couch involves a private citizen attempting to 
arrest a fleeing felon, the Michigan Supreme Court makes clear that it would 
apply the same rule if the person attempting the arrest were a police officer: 
In our view, even if the defendant were a police officer, Garner could not 
apply ‘directly’ as the basis for a homicide charge. That would require, in 
effect, two different definitions of both murder and manslaughter, one for 
police officers and one for the rest of us. Such a scheme could raise a 
significant constitutional question. 
Id. at 684 n. 1. 
A post-Couch case (which, like Couch, involved a private citizen asserting the 
fleeing felon defense) recites the common law rule in Michigan: 
 
 222. In 1986, following Garner, Maryland’s Attorney General published a letter concluding 
that Maryland’s law enforcement policies are in line with Garner. 1986 WL 287649, 71 Md. Op. 
Atty. Gen. 87 (1986). Maryland’s common law rule has developed to conclude that force can only 
be justified when it complies with law enforcement policies. See State v. Albrecht, 649 A.2d 336, 
349–50 (1994); State v. Pagotto, 762 A.2d 97, 103–07, 112 (2000). 
 223. A recent case repeated the rule from Randazzo, though it did not reach the issue. Com. v. 
Asher, N.E.3d 1055, 1059 (Mass. 2015) 
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To justify the use of deadly force to prevent the escape of a fleeing felon: “(1) 
the evidence must show that a felony actually occurred, (2) the fleeing suspect 
against whom force was used must be the person who committed the felony, 
and (3) the use of deadly force must have been ‘necessary’ to ensure the 
apprehension of the felon.” Id. at 596-597. Necessity is a question of fact for 
the jury to decide. Id. at 597. In addition, the private person must apply 
reasonable care to prevent the felon’s escape without violence. People v. 
Couch, 436 Mich. 414, 421; 461 NW2d 683 (1990), quoting People v. 
Gonsler, 251 Mich. 443, 446–447; 232 NW 365 (1930). 
People v. Spears, 267572, 2007 WL 1203537, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 
2007).  
Minnesota Garner category: G Current category: G-s 
Subd. 2. Use of deadly force 
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 609.06 or 609.065, the use of 
deadly force by a peace officer in the line of duty is justified only when 
necessary: 
(1) to protect the peace officer or another from apparent death or great bodily 
harm; 
(2) to effect the arrest or capture, or prevent the escape, of a person whom 
the peace officer knows or has reasonable grounds to believe has 
committed or attempted to commit a felony involving the use or 
threatened use of deadly force; or 
(3) to effect the arrest or capture, or prevent the escape, of a person whom 
the officer knows or has reasonable grounds to believe has committed or 
attempted to commit a felony if the officer reasonably believes that the 
person will cause death or great bodily harm if the person’s apprehension 
is delayed. 
MINN. STAT. § 609.066.  
Mississippi Garner category: CL Current category: CL-s 
(1) The killing of a human being by the act, procurement or omission of 
another shall be justifiable in the following cases: 
(a) When committed by public officers, or those acting by their aid and 
assistance, in obedience to any judgment of a competent court; 
(b) When necessarily committed by public officers, or those acting by their 
command in their aid and assistance, in overcoming actual resistance to the 
execution of some legal process, or to the discharge of any other legal duty; 
(c) When necessarily committed by public officers, or those acting by their 
command in their aid and assistance, in retaking any felon who has been 
rescued or has escaped; 
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(d) When necessarily committed by public officers, or those acting by their 
command in their aid and assistance, in arresting any felon fleeing from 
justice; 
MISS. CODE. ANN. § 97-3-15.  
Missouri Garner category: CL Current category: CL-s 
3. A law enforcement officer in effecting an arrest or in preventing an 
escape from custody is justified in using deadly force only 
(1) When such is authorized under other sections of this chapter; or 
(2) When he reasonably believes that such use of deadly force is 
immediately necessary to effect the arrest and also reasonably believes 
that the person to be arrested 
(a) Has committed or attempted to commit a felony; or 
(b) Is attempting to escape by use of a deadly weapon; or 
(c) May otherwise endanger life or inflict serious physical injury unless 
arrested without delay. 
MO. REV. STAT. § 563.046.  
Montana Garner category: ? Current category: ? 
Still no statute or case law on point. The closest it comes is a statute regarding 
use of force to present escape from custody. 
MONTANA STAT. 45-3-106.  
Nebraska Garner category: MPC Current category: G-s 
(3) The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this section unless: 
(a) The arrest is for a felony; 
(b) Such person effecting the arrest is authorized to act as a peace officer or is 
assisting a person whom he believes to be authorized to act as a peace officer; 
(c) The actor believes that the force employed creates no substantial risk of 
injury to innocent persons; and 
(d) The actor believes that: 
(i) The crime for which the arrest is made involved conduct including the 
use or threatened use of deadly force; or 
(ii) There is a substantial risk that the person to be arrested will cause 
death or serious bodily harm if his apprehension is delayed. 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1412.  
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Nevada Garner category: CL Current category: G-s 
If necessary to prevent escape, an officer may, after giving a warning, if 
feasible, use deadly force to effect the arrest of a person only if there is 
probable cause to believe that the person: 
1. Has committed a felony which involves the infliction or threat of serious 
bodily harm or the use of deadly force; or 2. Poses a threat of serious 
bodily harm to the officer or to others. 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.1455.  
New Hampshire Garner category: G Current category: G-s 
II. A law enforcement officer is justified in using deadly force only when 
he reasonably believes such force is necessary: 
(a) To defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes is the 
imminent use of deadly force; or 
(b) To effect an arrest or prevent the escape from custody of a person 
whom he reasonably believes: 
(1) Has committed or is committing a felony involving the use of force or 
violence, is using a deadly weapon in attempting to escape, or otherwise 
indicates that he is likely to seriously endanger human life or inflict 
serious bodily injury unless apprehended without delay; and 
(2) He had made reasonable efforts to advise the person that he is a law 
enforcement officer attempting to effect an arrest and has reasonable grounds 
to believe that the person is aware of these facts. 
(c) Nothing in this paragraph constitutes justification for conduct by a law 
enforcement officer amounting to an offense against innocent persons whom 
he is not seeking to arrest or retain in custody. 
VIII. Deadly force shall be deemed reasonably necessary under this section 
whenever the arresting law enforcement officer reasonably believes that the 
arrest is lawful and there is apparently no other possible means of effecting the 
arrest. 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:5.  
New Jersey Garner category: G Current category: G-s 
(2) The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this section unless: 
(a) The actor effecting the arrest is authorized to act as a peace officer or 
has been summoned by and is assisting a person whom he reasonably believes 
to be authorized to act as a peace officer; and 
(b) The actor reasonably believes that the force employed creates no 
substantial risk of injury to innocent persons; and 
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(c) The actor reasonably believes that the crime for which the arrest is 
made was homicide, kidnapping, an offense under 2C:14-2 or 2C:14-3, 
arson, robbery, burglary of a dwelling, or an attempt to commit one of 
these crimes; and 
(d) The actor reasonably believes: 
(i) There is an imminent threat of deadly force to himself or a third party; or 
(ii) The use of deadly force is necessary to thwart the commission of a crime as 
set forth in subparagraph (c) of this paragraph; or 
(iii) The use of deadly force is necessary to prevent an escape. 
N. J. STAT. § 2C:3-7.  
New Mexico Garner category: CL Current category: G-s 
A. Homicide is justifiable when committed by a public officer or public 
employee or those acting by their command and in their aid and assistance: 
(1) in obedience to any judgment of a competent court; 
(2) when necessarily committed in overcoming actual resistance to the 
execution of some legal process or to the discharge of any other legal duty; 
(3) when necessarily committed in retaking felons who have been rescued or 
who have escaped or when necessarily committed in arresting felons fleeing 
from justice; or 
(4) when necessarily committed in order to prevent the escape of a felon from 
any place of lawful custody or confinement. 
B. For the purposes of this section, homicide is necessarily committed when 
a public officer or public employee has probable cause to believe he or 
another is threatened with serious harm or deadly force while performing 
those lawful duties described in this section. Whenever feasible, a public 
officer or employee should give warning prior to using deadly force. 
N. M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-6.  
New York Garner category: G Current category: G-s 
1. [E]xcept that deadly physical force may be used for such purposes only 
when he or she reasonably believes that: 
(a) The offense committed by such person was: 
(i) a felony or an attempt to commit a felony involving the use or 
attempted use or threatened imminent use of physical force against a 
person; or 
(ii) kidnapping, arson, escape in the first degree, burglary in the first 
degree or any attempt to commit such a crime; or 
(b) The offense committed or attempted by such person was a felony and that, 
in the course of resisting arrest therefor or attempting to escape from 
custody, such person is armed with a firearm or deadly weapon; or 
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(c) Regardless of the particular offense which is the subject of the arrest or 
attempted escape, the use of deadly physical force is necessary to defend the 
police officer or peace officer or another person from what the officer 
reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of deadly physical force. 
N.Y. PENAL LAW. § 35.30 (Consol.).  
North Carolina Garner category: G Current category: G-s 
(d) Use of Force in Arrest.—. . . 
(2) A law-enforcement officer is justified in using deadly physical force 
upon another person for a purpose specified in subdivision (1) of this 
subsection only when it is or appears to be reasonably necessary thereby: 
a. To defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be 
the use or imminent use of deadly physical force; 
b. To effect an arrest or to prevent the escape from custody of a person 
who he reasonably believes is attempting to escape by means of a deadly 
weapon, or who by his conduct or any other means indicates that he 
presents an imminent threat of death or serious physical injury to others 
unless apprehended without delay; or 
c. To prevent the escape of a person from custody imposed upon him as a 
result of conviction for a felony. 
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-401.  
North Dakota Garner category: G Current category: G-s 
2. Deadly force is justified in the following instances: . . . 
(d.) When used by a public servant authorized to effect arrests or prevent 
escapes, if the force is necessary to effect an arrest or to prevent the escape 
from custody of an individual who has committed or attempted to commit 
a felony involving violence, or is attempting to escape by the use of a 
deadly weapon, or has otherwise indicated that the individual is likely to 
endanger human life or to inflict serious bodily injury unless apprehended 
without delay. 
N.D. CENT. CODE 12.1-05-07.  
Ohio Garner category: CL Current category: G-c 
Post Garner, Ohio has adopted a Garner-like rule by case law. 
Courts therefore apply Garner and Graham in reviewing criminal convictions 
arising from a police officer’s use of deadly force. See, e.g., United States v. 
Ramos, 537 F.3d 439, 457 (5th Cir.2008) (“there is no question but that a 
police officer’s unjustifiable shooting of a victim qualifies as a crime of 
violence; there is no question but that a police officer’s shooting a victim who 
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poses no physical threat to the safety of the officer or the public is 
unjustifiable”); State v. Pagotto, 361 Md. 528, 555, 762 A.2d 97 (2000) 
(prosecution of police officer for involuntary manslaughter and reckless 
endangerment); State v. Smith, 73 Conn. App. 173, 198, 807 A.2d 500 (2002) 
(prosecution of police officer for first-degree manslaughter); State v. Mantelli, 
131 N.M. 692, 2002–NMCA–033, 42 P.3d 272, ¶ 31 (prosecution of police 
officer for voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, 
and shooting at a motor vehicle resulting in injury); People v. Martin, 168 Cal. 
App. 3d 1111, 1124, 214 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1985) (noting that Garner “limits the 
scope of justification for homicide”). 
State v. White, 29 N.E.3d 939, 947 (Ohio 2015).224  
Oklahoma Garner category: CL Current category: G-s 
A peace officer, correctional officer, or any person acting by his command in 
his aid and assistance, is justified in using deadly force when: False 
2. In effecting an arrest or preventing an escape from custody following 
arrest and the officer reasonably believes both that: 
a. such force is necessary to prevent the arrest from being defeated by 
resistance or escape, and 
b. there is probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has 
committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of 
serious bodily harm, or the person to be arrested is attempting to escape 
by use of a deadly weapon, or otherwise indicates that he will endanger 
human life or inflict great bodily harm unless arrested without delay; or 
3. The officer is in the performance of his legal duty or the execution of legal 
process and reasonably believes the use of the force is necessary to protect 
himself or others from the infliction of serious bodily harm; or 
4. The force is necessary to prevent an escape from a penal institution or other 
place of confinement used primarily for the custody of persons convicted of 
felonies or from custody while in transit thereto or therefrom unless the officer 
has reason to know: 
a. the person escaping is not a person who has committed a felony involving 
violence, and 
b. the person escaping is not likely to endanger human life or to inflict serious 
bodily harm if not apprehended. 
OKLA. STAT. TIT. 21 § 732.  
 
 224. See also State v. White, 988 N.E.2d 595, 612 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015) (stating that “it 
would seem logical” that Garner would apply in a criminal prosecution). 
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Oregon Garner category: CL Current category: CL-s 
(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of ORS 161.235 [general provisions for use 
of force while making an arrest or preventing escape], a peace officer may use 
deadly physical force only when the peace officer reasonably believes that: 
(a) The crime committed by the person was a felony or an attempt to commit a 
felony involving the use or threatened imminent use of physical force against a 
person; or 
(b) The crime committed by the person was kidnapping, arson, escape in the 
first degree, burglary in the first degree or any attempt to commit such a crime; 
or 
(c) Regardless of the particular offense which is the subject of the arrest or 
attempted escape, the use of deadly physical force is necessary to defend the 
peace officer or another person from the use or threatened imminent use of 
deadly physical force; or 
(d) The crime committed by the person was a felony or an attempt to 
commit a felony and under the totality of the circumstances existing at the 
time and place, the use of such force is necessary; or 
(e) The officer’s life or personal safety is endangered in the particular 
circumstances involved. 
OR. REV. STAT. § 161.239.  
Pennsylvania Garner category: G Current category: G-s 
(a) Peace officer’s use of force in making arrest.— 
(1) A peace officer . . . . is justified in the use of any force which he believes 
to be necessary to effect the arrest and of any force which he believes to be 
necessary to defend himself or another from bodily harm while making the 
arrest. However, he is justified in using deadly force only when he believes 
that such force is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to 
himself or such other person, or when he believes both that: 
(i) such force is necessary to prevent the arrest from being defeated by 
resistance or escape; and 
(ii) the person to be arrested has committed or attempted a forcible felony 
or is attempting to escape and possesses a deadly weapon, or otherwise 
indicates that he will endanger human life or inflict serious bodily injury 
unless arrested without delay. 
PA. CONS. STAT. § 508.  
Rhode Island Garner category: CL Current category: CL-s 
A police officer may use force dangerous to human life to make a lawful 
arrest for committing or attempting to commit a felony, whenever he or 
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she reasonably believes that force dangerous to human life is necessary to 
effect the arrest and that the person to be arrested is aware that a peace 
officer is attempting to arrest him or her. 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-7-9.  
South Carolina Garner category: ? Current category: CL-s 
South Carolina seems to follow the old common law rule by case law, despite 
apparently applying the Garner rule to test the legality of the officer’s use of 
force in Sheppard v. State. South Carolina still has confusing and incoherent 
case law. In 2004, the Supreme Court of South Carolina incorrectly recited the 
Garner rule: 
The trial court also properly charged that an officer may use whatever force is 
necessary to effect the arrest of a felon including deadly force to effect that 
arrest. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 
(1985) (during felony arrest, if arresting officer has probable cause to believe 
suspect poses threat of serious physical harm, officer may prevent escape by 
using deadly force). 
Sheppard v. State, 594 S.E.2d 462, 473 (2004).  
South Dakota Garner category: CL Current category: CL-s 
Lawful force in arrest and delivery of felon 
To use or attempt to use or offer to use force or violence upon or toward the 
person of another is not unlawful if necessarily committed by any person in 
arresting someone who has committed any felony or in delivering that person 
to a public officer competent to receive him or her in custody. 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-18-3. 
Justifiable homicide. Law enforcement officers or at command of officer—
Overcoming resistance—Capturing or arresting fleeing felons. 
Homicide is justifiable if committed by a law enforcement officer or by any 
person acting by command of a law enforcement officer in the aid and 
assistance of that officer: 
(1) If necessarily committed in overcoming actual resistance to the execution 
of some legal process, or to the discharge of any other legal duty; or 
(2) If necessarily committed in retaking felons who have been rescued or who 
have escaped; or 
(3) If necessarily committed in arresting felons fleeing from justice 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-18-2. 
Justifiable homicide. Apprehending felon—Suppressing riot—Preserving 
peace. 
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Homicide is justifiable if necessarily committed in attempting by lawful 
ways and means to apprehend any person for any felony committed, or in 
lawfully suppressing any riot, or in lawfully keeping and preserving the peace. 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-33.  
Tennessee Garner category: CL Current category: G-s 
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) [general provision allowing officer, after 
identifying self, to use or threaten to use force], the officer may use deadly 
force to effect an arrest only if all other reasonable means of apprehension 
have been exhausted or are unavailable, and where feasible, the officer has 
given notice of the officer’s identity as an officer and given a warning that 
deadly force may be used unless resistance or flight ceases, and: 
(1) The officer has probable cause to believe the individual to be arrested 
has committed a felony involving the infliction or threatened infliction of 
serious bodily injury; or 
(2) The officer has probable cause to believe that the individual to be 
arrested poses a threat of serious bodily injury, either to the officer or to 
others unless immediately apprehended. 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-620.  
Texas Garner category: G Current category: G-s 
(c) A peace officer is justified in using deadly force against another when 
and to the degree the peace officer reasonably believes the deadly force is 
immediately necessary to make an arrest, or to prevent escape after arrest, if 
the use of force would have been justified under Subsection (a) and: 
(1) the actor reasonably believes the conduct for which arrest is 
authorized included the use or attempted use of deadly force; or 
(2) the actor reasonably believes there is a substantial risk that the person 
to be arrested will cause death or serious bodily injury to the actor or 
another if the arrest is delayed. 
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.51.  
Utah Garner category: G Current category: G-s 
(1) A peace officer, or any person acting by his command in his aid and 
assistance, is justified in using deadly force when: 
(a) the officer is acting in obedience to and in accordance with the judgment of 
a competent court in executing a penalty of death under Subsection 77-18-
5.5(3) or (4); 
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(b) effecting an arrest or preventing an escape from custody following an 
arrest, where the officer reasonably believes that deadly force is necessary 
to prevent the arrest from being defeated by escape; and 
(i) the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed 
a felony offense involving the infliction or threatened infliction of death or 
serious bodily injury; or 
(ii) the officer has probable cause to believe the suspect poses a threat of 
death or serious bodily injury to the officer or to others if apprehension is 
delayed; or 
(c) the officer reasonably believes that the use of deadly force is necessary to 
prevent death or serious bodily injury to the officer or another person. 
(2) If feasible, a verbal warning should be given by the officer prior to any use 
of deadly force under Subsection (1)(b) or (1)(c). 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-404.  
Vermont Garner category: G Current category: G-s 
Justifiable homicide. If a person kills or wounds another under any of the 
circumstances enumerated below, he or she shall be guiltless: 
(1) In the just and necessary defense of his or her own life or the life of his or 
her husband, wife, parent, child, brother, sister, master, mistress, servant, 
guardian or ward; or 
(2) In the suppression of a person attempting to commit murder, sexual 
assault, aggravated sexual assault, burglary or robbery, with force or 
violence; or 
(3) In the case of a civil officer; or a military officer or private soldier when 
lawfully called out to suppress riot or rebellion, or to prevent or suppress 
invasion, or to assist in serving legal process, in suppressing opposition against 
him or her in the just and necessary discharge of his or her duty. 
VT. STAT. ANN. § 2305.  
Virginia Garner category: CL Current category: CL-c 
Still has the older common law rule. However, Virginia courts get much use 
out of “necessity” by giving the question of whether the use of lethal force was 
necessary to the jury with virtually no limits on what the jury can consider 
(including the gravity of the felony committed by the fleeing person and 
apparently even the gravity of the crime the officer is charged with) and have 
affirmed manslaughter convictions against police officers, both before and 
after Garner.225  
 
 225. See Hendricks v. Com., 178 S.E. 8, 12 (Va. 1935); see also Couture v. Com., 656 S.E.2d 
425, 427-28 (Va. Ct. App. 2008). 
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Washington Garner category: CL Current category: G-s 
Justifiable homicide or use of deadly force by public officer, peace officer, 
person aiding 
(1) Homicide or the use of deadly force is justifiable in the following cases: 
False 
(c) When necessarily used by a peace officer or person acting under the 
officer’s command and in the officer’s aid: 
(i) To arrest or apprehend a person who the officer reasonably believes 
has committed, has attempted to commit, is committing, or is attempting 
to commit a felony; . . . . 
(2) In considering whether to use deadly force under subsection (1) (c) of this 
section, to arrest or apprehend any person for the commission of any crime, the 
peace officer must have probable cause to believe that the suspect, if not 
apprehended, poses a threat of serious physical harm to the officer or a 
threat of serious physical harm to others. Among the circumstances which 
may be considered by peace officers as a “threat of serious physical harm” 
are the following: 
(a) The suspect threatens a peace officer with a weapon or displays a 
weapon in a manner that could reasonably be construed as threatening; or 
(b) There is probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed any 
crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical 
harm. 
Under these circumstances deadly force may also be used if necessary to 
prevent escape from the officer, where, if feasible, some warning is given. 
(3) A public officer or peace officer shall not be held criminally liable for 
using deadly force without malice and with a good faith belief that such act is 
justifiable pursuant to this section. 
WASH. REV. CODE §9A.16.040. 
If after notice of the intention to arrest the defendant, he or she either flee or 
forcibly resist, the officer may use all necessary means to effect the arrest. 
WASH. REV. CODE §10.31.050.  
West Virginia Garner category: CL Current category: CL-c 
West Virginia still has the common law rule by its case law. A 2012 civil case 
(including state tort claims as well as § 1983) involving a claim for damages 
for excessive (but not lethal) use of force by an officer in dealing with a person 
reported as being suicidal did not even mention Garner: 
Respondents Cayton and the West Virginia State Police argue that an 
excessive force claim must be analyzed under an objectionably reasonable 
standard, which does not require the officer to use the least intrusive means to 
effectuate a seizure or even the minimum amount of force available. According 
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to respondents, reasonableness is instead judged by whether the officer’s use of 
force was within a range of conduct that could be deemed to have been 
reasonable under the circumstances. Because the officers had a reasonable 
belief petitioner would harm himself, respondents argue that the actions were 
warranted and did not constitute excessive force. Further, respondents argue 
that petitioner’s expert’s testimony did not create a genuine issue of material 
fact because the circuit court found that the expert misstated the relevant legal 
standard for the use of force and then properly ruled his testimony to be 
irrelevant. 
Posey v. Davis, 11-1204, 2012 WL 5857309, at *2 (W. Va. Nov. 16, 2012).  
Wisconsin Garner category: CL Current category: CL-s 
939.45 Privilege. The fact that the actor’s conduct is privileged, although 
otherwise criminal, is a defense to prosecution for any crime based on that 
conduct. The defense of privilege can be claimed under any of the 
following circumstances: . . . . 
(4) When the actor’s conduct is a reasonable accomplishment of a lawful 
arrest; 
WIS. STAT. § 939.45(4) (2015).226  
Wyoming Garner category: ? Current category: G-c 
Wyoming still has no statute and no case law on point. It remains in the 
unknown category. 
The title of Article 6 of the criminal code is “Justification.” The only 
justification statute is the justified use of force in self-defense/defense of others 
statute which makes no mention of arrest or any special justification for police 
officers. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-602. Section 6-2-601, however, states, “The 
common law shall govern in all cases not governed by this article.” 
But a post-Garner case seems to apply Garner to this fact set: 
During that felony traffic stop, the suspect exited the vehicle as directed by the 
police officers, but he failed to follow police orders to keep his hands up and 
began to move forward as if to run in spite of a police order to halt. As the 
suspect moved, he also reached with his left hand toward the small of his back. 
One of the officers, believing the suspect was reaching for a weapon and 
 
 226. But, the annotated statutes published by the legislature mentions the same case 
mentioned in Garner footnote 14: 
“Flight on the part of one suspected of a felony does not, of itself, warrant the use of deadly force 
by an arresting officer, and it is only in certain aggravated circumstances that a police officer may 
shoot a fleeing suspect. Clark v. Ziedonis, 368 F. Supp. 544 (1973).” See also http://docs.legis. 
wisconsin.gov/document/statutes/939.45. 
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perceiving a threat, discharged his shotgun, hitting the suspect. The suspect 
was then apprehended. 
Roose v. State, 759 P.2d 478, 479 (Wyo. 1988). The Wyoming Supreme Court 
quoted the rule from Garner, and then concluded, “Looking at the totality of 
the circumstances in this case and recognizing that a police officer must make 
split second decisions regarding such grave matters, we hold that the police 
officer was justified in using the force he used in this instance.” Id. at 484. 
 
 
